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 The following paper looks at intelligence failures and military failures through the 
lens of adaptation failure.  This paper asserts that there is reason to believe that certain 
causal elements of alleged intelligence failures reside more so in the province of politics, 
than in the collection and analysis domain of intelligence tradecraft.  This is not to say 
that failures are exclusively of a political nature, but that looking at politics and the 
relationship of policymakers to the Intelligence Community yields a preponderance of 
causal evidence.  Secondly, it is suggested that a parallel set of underlying assumptions 
evident in adaptation failure theory may be observed in military failures as well.  This 
leads to the final analysis, which tends to suggest that it is anything but final and 






Why had the United States, in recent history exhibited a slow response to 
environmental changes within the realm of national security?  Since the end of the Cold 
War the U.S. appears to have been sluggish in adapting to the absence of the Soviet 
Union and the emergence of new threats.  Namely, the Intelligence Community and the 
military have been unable to modify their perception of threats facing the U.S. in a timely 
fashion.  This is not to say that there has been no significant change, but simply too little1 
(and perhaps a bit late) to meet the evolution of the global security milieu.  This paper 
deals with adaptation failure as a theory that has recently been developed with regard to 
the Intelligence Community (IC).  If the theory is robust it may resonate in other quarters.   
Therefore, we shall attempt to view the decision process and its effect on the application 
of force in Iraq (and Afghanistan to some extent) through the same prism2. 
This paper considers the following two questions: Did the process of changing the 
strategy in Iraq reflect the same failure to adapt to an unconventional war as that which 
had plagued the Intelligence Community with regard to global terrorism?  Secondly, is 
there a larger adaptation failure at play, namely strategic failure?  These questions are 
important because if there is a parallel set of antecedents leading to distortion in both 
categories then there is reason to believe that they may be subordinate to a broader issue.  
                                                            
1 As will be discussed throughout this paper, there have been numerous commissions regarding 
“intelligence reform”.  Though many of the same problems have been identified (e.g. a lack of: foreign 
language speakers, culturally aware analysts, and a sense of “corporateness” to name a few), they have 
persisted.   
2 While speaking of the “military” the author realizes that military decisions are inherently controlled by 
civilian leadership when addressing matters of Grand Strategy.  Therefore, the term “military” represents 
not only the uniformed services, but their civilian masters as well.   
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If so, then perhaps it is destined to be repeated; not just within the halls of Langley and 
Arlington3, but possibly having implications beyond. 
Methods 
 The approach here is threefold, in that, a brief review of intelligence failures and 
military failures should serve to highlight the problem.   Proceeding forward, this paper 
will look deeper into the points of friction between policymakers and their subordinate 
intelligence and military communities.  Then, as these interactions are highlighted, the 
processes that tend to show causative relationships will be analyzed forensically.  It is 
hoped that by this method we can juxtapose the subsequent findings with the broad 
category of strategic failure.  In this effort, the objective is to determine whether further 
research is warranted to test the hypothesis in the realm of Grand Strategy.         
Sources  
 In order to approach the subject matter involved in this thesis it would be folly to 
limit research to the twin inventories of intelligence and military literature.  To truly 
understand strategic decisions and how they affect policy (and the resultant effects that 
tend to follow) it is necessary to go beyond the comfort of a singular thread of academic 
discourse.  It requires the consultation of seemingly boundless spheres of study; if only 
for the sake of the global impact that American strategic decisions may generate.  It is 
therefore most appropriate that this paper has been spawned through research in a variety 
of areas including, but not limited to Organizational Learning, Organizational 
Psychology, Social Psychology, Political Psychology, Military History, Anthropology, 
                                                            
3 This is a reference to the cities in Virginia that are home to CIA and the Pentagon, respectively.   
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Middle East (Near East) History, Surprise Attacks, Intelligence Failures, Insurgencies 
and Counterinsurgencies4. 
Declaration of personal biases 
 It would not be fair if your author did not declare the following biases.  (1) This 
paper is American-centric, as the terrorist acts forming the casus belli had targeted 
American interests, property, and lives.  In coming to terms with a very potent 
transnational terrorist threat environment, and the outcome of American decisions, the 
author has become directly involved in both the intelligence and military organizations 
that have necessarily responded.  
(2) Though various international relations theories provide insight here, there is an 
ever-present (yet hopefully nearly imperceptible) neorealist5 hue that may tend to color 
the author’s articulation.  It is tempered, however, by alternative perspectives.  In the 
                                                            
4 As this paper deals with adaptation- the precursor for which is learning- the fields of organizational 
learning and organizational psychology have been useful in understanding the full spectrum within which 
decisions pertaining to a shift in organizational direction are made.   Having a smattering of social and 
political psychology informs the reader/researcher of the individual and group processes by which 
decisions are taken, as well as explaining some of the impediments to that end.  An understanding of 
military history, as it relates to the latter half of this paper, allows for the similarities/differences between 
military campaigns to be properly recognized in a more concise form.  This perspective tends to place in 
context, interactions within and between the multitude of agencies, and to gauge the efficacy of policy 
pursuits to achieve military “victory”.  Middle East history describes the conditions under which the post-
9/11 threat environment had emerged.  As for intelligence failures, they are often found to be largely 
inextricably linked, as a forceful independent variable in surprise attack literature.  Admittedly, this link 
does not fully explain what effect policy choices have had in forming the exploitable vulnerabilities that 
render a state susceptible to disaster.  The success of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies tend to be 
explained through the prisms of anthropology and sociology.  Invariably the latter two regions of study are 
human-centric approaches to the broader phenomena of the former two. 
5 The neorealist school of thought that the author subscribes to is admittedly most applicable under normal, 
conventional conditions.  That is, the structural relationships between nation-states in an anarchic world 
(lacking a central sovereign) tend to produce certain interactive dynamics geared toward self-preservation.  
Theory of International Politics, Kenneth N. Waltz, ( Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., (1979).  
While this Westphalian states system is assumed to be the “norm”, and power-balancing an outcome, the 
author recognizes that neorealist thought has been challenged and has spawned theories of “Complex 
Interdependence”, as developed and advanced by, among others, Keohane and Nye.  See: Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1977).     
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interest of space and scope this paper will not entertain, on theoretical grounds, the merits 
of international relations theory since the primary focus is centered on transnational 


















Introduction and Thesis Statement 
 For some time now, studies have been indicating that the events of 9/11/01 were 
not detected and defeated in advance as a consequence of intelligence failure(s).  While 
this is a very broad category and much has been written on it, there is a particular strand 
of literature that this paper seeks to explore and perhaps even apply to another category 
of perceived failure: strategic failure as it relates to the application of military force.  
Recently, a very robust case has been made by Amy Zegart regarding a “failure to adapt” 
by the Intelligence Community6.   
Following the surprise attack on 11 September 20017, the U.S. has been engaged 
in wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and globally in its campaign against “terror.”8  Following 
initial conventional military victories in both Iraq and Afghanistan, symptoms have 
appeared that are consistent with Zegart’s “adaptation failure” hypothesis.  Namely, the 
requisite shift from conventional military operations to Irregular Warfare geared toward 
the insurgencies that followed the American military intervention in the heart of the 
                                                            
6 The sum, substance and citation for Zegart’s work will follow in the second chapter. 
7 The attacks of 11 September were at the operational level a manipulation of American security 
shortcomings, while the tactical level consisted of suicide attacks that used airplanes as precision guided 
munitions.  Suicide attacks are not a new phenomenon.  Additionally, as Pape points out, the logic of 
suicide as an implement of war is not limited to the adherents of Islam and has a history dating back to 66 
CE: “The best known suicide operations before 1980 also had coercive aims.  The Zealots, the Assassins, 
and the kamikazes all sought to coerce their political opponents, either to remove foreign military forces 
from their homeland or to prevent imminent military invasions.”  See Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of 
Suicide Terrorism, Robert A. Pape (New York: Random House, 2005), quote from p. 33.      
8 It is a bit odd to declare that war is being waged against an emotional adjective.  Even less clear, if 
“terror” is a verb, then it appears to lose meaning when employing military action against such an abstract 
concept.  What makes matters even more nebulous is that engaging in a course of armed combat with 
“terrorists” presupposes that all enemies are engaged in “terrorism.”  Some members of the adversary 
groups may see themselves as resisting invasion and domination.  If their target set consists of a foreign 
army that is not indigenous to the area, then perhaps the “terrorism” label has few legs on which to stand.  
However, when the target set consists of civilians there is no disputing the patent facts.  The unintended 
effect of using such a label in such a broad manner cheapens its currency.  A similar case would be labeling 
all autocracies as “evil” and equating them with Adolf Hitler.  Such language should be reserved to 
describe a very limited number of regimes and characters.   
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Middle East.  Specifically, counterinsurgency (COIN) has not been applied early enough 
to avoid the bloodletting.   
This paper compares some of the causal lines drawn by Zegart and explores 
whether they are applicable to the recent war in Iraq9.  Specifically, the thesis is: If the 
U.S. Intelligence Community failed to adapt to a changed post-Cold War threat 
environment and this failure was paralleled by comparable missteps in the military 
realm, there appears to be ample evidence to signal that the bases of their malfunction 












9 Though Afghanistan may be just as appropriate to study, this paper is mostly limiting the majority of its 
scope to Iraq. 
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Chapter 1: Adaptation Failure in the Intelligence Community 
… Some observers believe that intelligence agencies may be in for a period of transition 
and adaptation exceeding the one that followed immediately upon the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. 
-Richard A. Best Jr.10 
 
The New World Order Revisited 
While the primary American enemy has ceased to be the Soviet Union, U.S. 
foreign policy response had been ill-defined in the decade that followed.  As the stability 
of the structurally bipolar world had disintegrated the United States found itself atop a 
unipolar11 global landscape.  The balance of power reconfiguration had caused stagnation 
in terms of strategic vision and the role of the U.S. in world affairs12.  The U.S. had a full 
decade to adjust its focus, yet seemed not to have been able to achieve a healthy sense of 
clarity.  It was as though intellectual inertia and ambiguous prioritization had displaced 
                                                            
10 Issue Brief for Congress: “Intelligence Issues for Congress”, Richard A. Best, Jr. (Foreign Affairs, 
Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service); updated 1 October, 2002, IB10012; p. 
CRS-2. 
11 The term “unipolar” here describes the global power structure.  For instance, “bipolarity” had been used 
as a shorthand term to illustrate the balance of power between the Soviet Bloc and Western powers during 
the Cold War.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “bipolarity” was no longer.  Though some may 
argue that “multipolarity” defines what had remained, the United States and her allies held at least some 
primacy in the period that followed.  This does not negate the possibility that rising global competitors may 
seek regional dominance, hence “multipolarity” would probably be a more appropriate descriptor (though 
admittedly it is a bit odd to declare more than two poles to be in existence).   
12 This period of time could perhaps be defined as transitional.  The policy arguments of the 1990s seemed 
to be geared toward returning to isolationism, or some form of retrenchment.  The threat environment was 
being looked at through a host of concerns from environmental and population factors to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) as a threat short of total annihilation.  For a more full treatment of these arguments see 
At Issue: Politics in the World Arena, Steven L. Spiegel and David J. Pervin eds, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1994, 7th Edition) and The Future of American Foreign Policy, Eugene R. Wittkopf and Christopher 
M. Jones eds., (New York: St. Martin’s/Worth Publishers, 1999).  It seems that there was awareness of the 
changing global social and political landscape, but the threat environment was not named to reflect 
something akin to “The Cold War.”  The term, “interregnum” was used to describe the period, but it was 
not conceptually helpful.  See Foreign Policy, Summer 2000, itself entitled, “What Comes after the ‘Post-
Cold War’”; pp. 44-46 addresses the interregnum (Christoph Bertram).  
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its ancestral lucidity, during the Cold War.  The Grand Strategy13 of that time was simple: 
containment14.  
As the moribund Grand Strategy15 of the prior half-century had not yielded a new 
approach, spillover effects appear to have trickled down to its subordinate national 
security apparatus16.   Hence, the IC had been unable to meet the demands of the rising 
specter of global jihadist terrorism.  In a similar vein, the military and civilian 
policymakers have had a hard time maintaining an adaptive capacity with regard to war 
fighting in Southwest Asia.   
Though the 2003 Iraq War had initially been similar to the conventional firepower 
and maneuver warfare of the past century, it soon morphed into something seemingly 
                                                            
13 B.H. Liddell Hart defines strategy as, “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the 
ends of policy”, whereas Grand Strategy is “… practically synonymous with the policy that guides the 
conduct of war…” in Strategy, B.H. Liddell Hart (New York: Meridian, second revised ed. 1991); quotes 
found on pp. 321-322.  Liddell Hart holds that Grand Strategy is superordinate to strategy, though both 
ultimately serve policy. 
14 Jeremi Suri claims the absence of a coherent conceptual model during the 1990s was applicable to both 
the administrations of George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton.  Suri describes that time period as being 
akin to an “anti-strategy.”  He asserts that what makes the formulation of a Grand Strategy rather difficult 
to come by is the pluralistic structure of American society.  “Grand Strategy requires consensus which is 
very difficult to build and sustain amidst the competition of interests and ideas that define American 
democracy.”  “American Grand Strategy from the Cold War’s End to 9/11”, Orbis, Fall, 2009, pp. 611-627; 
the quote was drawn from p. 626.  Therese Delpech essentially equates the 1990s with the period between 
WWI and WWII in “The Imbalance of Terror”, The Washington Quarterly, 25: 1 (Winter 2002) pp. 31-40.  
One might say that the fog of interwar is what impedes policy imagination. 
15 According to Henry Kissinger, “… the deepest reason for America’s difficulty in the 1990s with 
developing a coherent strategy for a world in which its role is so central was that three different generations 
with very different approaches to foreign policy were disputing America’s role.”  He indicates these three 
generations to be of the 1950s/60s Cold War, the Vietnam protest movement that followed and the 
generation that followed both and was unable to appreciate their predecessors’ paradigm.  Does America 
Need a Foreign Policy?:  Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2001); p. 28.   
16 The Intelligence Community is a broad term conferring a sense of unified agenda and outlook upon 15 
member organizations.  The  Department of Defense is a large constituent element of national security, 
which contains all of the service branches’ intelligence units (and DIA- Defense Intelligence Agency).  In a 
democracy, all members of the IC are necessarily subordinate to policymakers’ priorities as informed by 
their comprehension of international affairs.  This can be skewed by biases on either side of the divide (a 
major theme of this paper). 
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foreign: irregular warfare in the form of insurgency17.  Both the IC in the period 1991- 
2001 and the military in the period 2001- 2006 were woefully unprepared to meet the 
threats that the U.S. had faced.  The reasons why, it is hoped, will be adequately 
addressed regularly throughout this paper.  
Terrorism as a tool had taken on new meaning in 2001.  The weaknesses of 
Western intelligence were effectively exploited on 11 September.  What was different in 
this new environment were the limitless objectives of the terrorists, their use of American 
openness, an inability to be deterred (as suicide-homicide had been the chosen method of 
attack), and the knowledge that the American IC was bound by legal constraints that 
prohibited the requisite penetration of the HUMINT (Human Intelligence) target: dirty 
assets.18 
Defining Adaptation Failure 
The main theme of this work is centered on adaptation.  Therefore, it is worth 
defining in precise terms.  Adaptation is distinguished from change in a very specific 
way.  To simply change is a more basic action, similar to a modification in appearance.  
                                                            
17 Insurgency is not a new concept.  As will be discussed later, the Vietnam War had been fought largely by 
America’s adversary as an insurgency, whose aim (by definition) was to upset the legitimacy of the ruling 
government in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).  The American experience in that war left a bad 
taste in mouths of the would-be military leaders in the decades to come.  Also, the U.S. had often played 
the supporting role for a variety of insurgencies during the Cold War, a subject beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
18There are costs associated with such a moral soiling.  This point is noted by Gregory F. Treverton in 
“Covert Action and Open Society”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 5 (Summer, 1987), 995-1014.   
It has been argued that the political consequences of dealing with persons such as those who perpetrate acts 
of terror against a civilian populace are too costly to bear.  This case was made in part in J. Cilluffo, Ronald 
A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi, “The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence”, The Washington 
Quarterly, (Winter, 2002), 61-74.  One useful depiction of the changed threat environment is made on p. 
65: “Part of the changing face of international terrorism, referring to al Qaeda in particular, involves the 
terrorists’ ultimate objectives.  These networks no longer seek a seat at the negotiating table; instead, they 
want to blow up the table and build a new one in its place.”  




To adapt is to alter one’s approach to better match the environmental challenges it faces.  
It involves more depth and breadth.  An example that illustrates the difference between 
the two follows: When a police department decides to switch to a new uniform it is a 
mere change.  When the department decides that a new approach to crime-fighting is 
necessary to suit the level and nature of crime in the community, it has adapted19.   
 As a theory, “adaptation failure” has been generated and pursued by Amy B. 
Zegart, and shapes the central argument of this paper.  Though Zegart has studied 
adaptation failure with respect to the IC, it is a useful discussion to have as the second 
half of this paper asserts that the difficulty experienced by the IC in adapting to the post- 
Cold War threat environment may not only apply to the military, but to other elements of 
national import as well20.   
Zegart has had an opportunity to analyze failed intelligence reforms prior to 
9/1121.  She views efforts to reform as having suffered from a failure to adapt.  
Adaptation, Zegart asserts is a more appropriate term than change.  Adaptation connotes 
something entirely distinct from change.  When an organization experiences change it is a 
partial measure.  A more robust change may be measured by its magnitude, which may 
                                                            
19E.g. proactive policing (actively seeking criminal behavior, such as establishing a counter-narcotics unit), 
is an adaptive approach, whereas reactive policing (responding to a complaint and relying on luck and 
circumstance to detect illicit narcotic activity) may be the standard protocol. 
20 F.G. Hoffman has implied that there is reason to believe that such an adaptation failure applies to the 
military,  “The Anatomy of the Long War’s Failings”, Footnotes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 
2009, Vol. 14, No. 16.  This assessment is drawn heavily from Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of 
Failure in War, Eliot Cohen and John Gooch (New York: Free Press, 1990).  The term “adaptation” is 
defined here as “the ability ‘to handle the changing present’ and the interactive nature of war.”  The 2006 
edition of this book in paperback addresses the American military experience in Iraq, though briefly; pp. 
247-251.  Cohen and Gooch claim that American failure in Iraq is owed to a failure to anticipate, but more 
so to a failure to learn.  This paper asserts that these categories of failure are merely subordinate children to 
their parent cause: adaptation failure (which they include as a conceptual equal to the other two).  
Moreover, as the subtitle indicates, this book is a study of failure in war, not in the preceding decision 
phases leading to war.  Nonetheless, their case studies are quite thorough. 
21 Amy B. Zegart, “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11”, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 1 (2006), 33-60.  
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be seen as a transformation.  Yet adaptation indicates a recognition that an “improved fit” 
must develop between an organization and its external environment22.  Zegart asserts that 
awareness of a changing environment prior to 9/11 had been prevalent within the IC and 
Congress, and numerous recommendations to better meet the new threats had not 
produced the requisite adaptation.   
The adaptation referred to here is that of an apparent organizational nature.  
During the post-Cold War period of the 1990s the IC did begin to focus more on 
combating terrorism23.  Apparently intelligence officials and policymakers were 
cognizant of a need for organizational change in response to such emerging threats.   
Between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 11 September 2001, no fewer than 
twelve major bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task forces 
examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts.  All of their 
reports urged reform within intelligence agencies, across the intelligence community, and 
between the intelligence community and other parts of the U.S. government.24 
Awareness is a necessary, but insufficient precursor for adaptation.  Zegart asserts 
that a failure to adapt was ever-present during the period 1991-2001.  She has observed 
340 recommendations for change from the above-mentioned twelve studies of the IC.  Of 
those, Zegart notes that ten percent were fully implemented25.  Even where commissions 
had convened to study the role of law enforcement in counterterrorism, a large part of 
their recommendations focused on the IC.   
                                                            
22 Ibid.; pp.35-36. 
23 Ibid.; p. 40. 
24 Ibid.; pp. 45-46; see Table 2 on p. 46 as it tallies the above-referenced studies.  (Also see Spying Blind: 
The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11, Amy B. Zegart [Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2007]; pp. 32-33). 
25 Ibid.; p. 52.  
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Four common findings were observed during this period26.  First, from an 
organizational leadership perspective the IC was structurally misaligned.  The DCI 
(Director of Central Intelligence) was both the head of the IC itself and head of the CIA.  
Given that the Secretary of Defense had 85% of the intelligence budget, the DCI was 
really placed in a position of impotence with regard to resources and funding.  As he 
delivered the CIA-prepared PDB (President’s Daily Brief – which is now a community-
wide product) he was still the CIA’s director.  This makes the task of remaining unbiased 
toward any particular member unit of the IC difficult. Second, prioritization for collection 
and analysis was not only ineffective, it was observed to be lacking order and 
standardization.   
Third, among the many intelligence disciplines, HUMINT was sorely wanting for 
reasons related to legislation banning contact with human rights violators; which is 
precisely the class of individuals whom HUMINT collectors must co-opt, subvert, or 
otherwise coax for information.27  The fourth theme centers on personnel.  In one sense a 
deficiency in this category represents a more detrimental failure to adapt than the other 
categories do.  The reason is because in the post-Cold War world the rising threat was 
foreign terrorism.  This required a necessary response by the IC to attract and incentivize 
the educational enhancement of people who have the appropriate language proficiency 
and cultural appreciation to know one’s enemy (a central tenet in both war-fighting and 
intelligence tradition- usually attributed to Sun Tzu and Carl Von Clausewitz).  Lacking 
                                                            
26 Ibid.; pp. 53-55.  Note that these four themes are reviewed here in a cursory fashion.  It is in the interest 
of avoiding redundancy that these matters are not explored more heavily at this point.  However, if one 
reads this paper carefully it should become apparent that such themes are dealt with more insightfully at 
other points.     
27 See, “We Have Not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform”, Saxby Chambliss, 
Parameters, Spring 2005, pp. 5-13. 
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the will to fire poor performers also served as a hindrance.  Intelligence information 
sharing was also deeply deficient.  The IC could have done a better job of ensuring cross-
agency temporary rotations and encouraging an environment of information sharing.   
Causal Logic 
Zegart maintains that the key causal factor in adaptation failure was politics.  
Three seemingly simple, but insurmountable “enduring realities” appeared to be at play28.  
The “nature of bureaucratic organizations”, the “rational self-interest of political actors”, 
and the interests of national security bureaucrats with all of their attendant protectionist 
proclivities to guarantee they are secure29.   
 If Zegart is right about an adaptation failure- and it is this author’s position that 
she is, then perhaps there is an application that can be made to other areas of decision-
making.  Understanding what an adaptation failure looks like is important.  More 
important, however, is to understand what its component parts consist of.  This will 
enable one to view with clarity the phenomenon as it unfolds.  If such clarity could be 
had, then it may be possible to identify the antecedents of adaptation failure in order to 
mitigate its pernicious effects.  Should this be the case it would potentially have infinite 
application across many fields of government concern.   
 The reason that recognizing adaptation failure in its incipient phase is critical can 
be seen in every area of private and public life.  In the former, if a firm manufactures an 
outmoded product because it is unable to adapt to a changing market it will go out of 
                                                            
28 Zegart, “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms…”, p. 59. 




business.  It is nice to produce a horse-drawn carriage, but since consumers are 
demanding cars, buses, trains, and planes it is ineffectual.   
Studying Intelligence Failures: 
A large body of work regarding intelligence failures has centered on surprise 
attacks.30  As Richard K. Betts argues, it is quite ordinary for an IC to experience failure, 
as it has been suggested that failure is inevitable, natural, and to be expected31.  In many 
ways this idea had become a matter of accepted wisdom in the IC: 
In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom 
been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce 
finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of 
intelligence services.  Policy premises constrict perception, and administrative workloads 
constrain reflection.  Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than 
organizational.32 
 
 Insofar as the individual analysts’ cognitive barriers exist- and there are many 
such barriers- they are not the biggest cause of intelligence failure.  Indeed, it is the 
knowledge that intelligence consumers (policymakers) have themselves a number of 
cognitive barriers and biases that appear to have the greater impact on the intelligence 
failures.  The consumption end of the spectrum is composed of… “political men who 
                                                            
30 Richard A. Posner presents a useful analysis of “surprise attacks” in his book, Preventing Surprise 
Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11, Richard A. Posner, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005).  Special attention should be paid to Chapter 3 entitled, “The history and 
Anatomy of Successful Surprise Attacks” (pp. 73-97). 
31 Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable”, World 
Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Oct., 1978), 61-89.  “Intelligence failures are not only inevitable, they are natural”; 
p. 88. 
32 Ibid.; p.61. 
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have risen by being more decisive than reflective, more aggressive than introspective and 
confident as much as cautious.”33  
 Betts suggests that awareness of this phenomenon by analysts and producers may 
serve to diminish such misperceptions34.  Still, the attacking party has certain advantages 
of which it is difficult, if not impossible, to disarm them35.  That is, the victim may be 
lulled into a false sense of security by the attacker, built upon the victim’s own 
proclivities toward inaction.   Additionally, no one can afford to continuously warn of an 
impending attack, lest they be labeled as one who “cries wolf”, causing “alert fatigue” 
and resulting in a loss of credibility.  A “self-negating prophecy” may also be produced36.  
What’s more, as Betts indicates elsewhere, “deception is cheap.  Little investment in men 
and material is necessary, and the return is very high.”37   
Warning as the Less Significant Source of Failure than Decision: 
Decision makers are part of the intelligence process; intelligence failures implicate them 
as well.  For example, decision makers often say they want warnings when they actually 
do not.  Warnings usually imply a need to reorder priorities, including the allocation of 
resources. 
-Jennifer E. Sims38 
                                                            
33 Ibid.; p. 83.   
34 Ibid.; p.84.   
35 Richard K. Betts, “Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite’s Intelligence and 
Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
33, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), 329-343.   
36 Ibid.; p. 339.  The concept of a “self-negating prophecy” is explained elsewhere in Micromotives and 
Macrobehavior, Thomas C. Schelling, (New York and London, 1978); pp. 115-119.  Schelling discusses a 
number of “prophecies.”  They all have the commonality of origin: expectations. 
37 “Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 4 
(Winter, 1980-1981), 551-572; p. 564.   
38 “Understanding Friends and Enemies: The Context for American Intelligence Reform”, Jennifer E. Sims, 
in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, Eds., (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005); Chapter 2, p. 16. 
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 The function of intelligence is primarily that of warning.  Warning focuses on two 
categories: capabilities and intentions39.  The former is a Western strength (similar to 
“bean counting”40), whereas the latter is more difficult to know, given that select few in 
the adversary’s chain of command may be privy to such information.  
Western warning intelligence will be excellent though imperfect, persuasive but not 
irresistible.  The proficiency of intelligence can also be a mixed blessing.  Monitoring 
capability that is properly recognized to be excellent encourages reliance on warning, but 
since the principal of surprise is decision rather than warning, this dulls sensitivity to the 
possibility of sudden attack.41 
Still, the problem of timely warning is not as influential as human psychology and 
politics are42.   “Hedging against surprise is hard because the causes are deeply embedded 
in human psychology, political uncertainty, military complexity, and organizational 
viscosity.”43   
The Essence of Warning: 
The fact of surprise at Pearl Harbor has never been persuasively explained by accusing 
the participants, individually or in groups, of conspiracy or negligence or stupidity.  What 
these examples illustrate is rather the very human tendency to pay attention to the signals 
that support current expectations about enemy behavior.  If no one is listening for signals 
of an attack against a highly improbable target, then it is very difficult for the signals to 
be heard. 
-Roberta Wohlstetter44   
 
                                                            
39 Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, Cynthia M. Grabo, (Lanham, MD: University of 
America, Inc.: 2004); pp. 4-18.  At the tactical level, warning is more concerned with capabilities.  
However, at the strategic level, it should be more concerned with intentions.  “Strategic warning” is still ill-
defined. 
40 Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd Ed. Mark M. Lowenthal, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006); 
p. 223. 
41 Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning, Richard K. Betts, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1982); p. 198. 
42 Ibid.; p. 286. 
43 Ibid.; p. 309. 




  The “signal-to-noise” ratio may cause distortion in perception.  That is, the 
ability to collect is not necessarily the problem of warning as much as the ability to 
discern what a clear indication of enemy intentions may be.   There is a wealth of 
literature explaining the perception barriers to effective intelligence, which oftentimes 
leads to disastrous outcomes.   
The attack on Pearl Harbor is not in any way an anomaly.  Numerous 
conventional surprise attacks before and after Pearl Harbor seem to have suffered from 
very similar symptoms in that the signals were buried amongst the cacophony of noise.  
However, the thorough case study of that conventional surprise attack has provided much 
of the foundation for the examination of unconventional surprise attacks that have 
followed45.     
“Apparently human beings have a stubborn attachment to old beliefs and an 
equally stubborn resistance to new material that will upset them.”46  This problematic 
truth has not been diluted much since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  If anything, it 
is often made worse by the increasing ability to collect vast amounts of data that are 
unable to be processed by analysts (producers) in a timely fashion and digested by 
decision makers (consumers) who have their own paradigmatic predispositions regarding 
the global milieu and the source and nature of threats that abound.   
                                                            
45 Some examples of conventional surprise attacks that have been analyzed in detail were the 1941 Nazi 
advance into The Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), the 1968 North Vietnamese Tet Offensive, the 
1973 Egyptian crossing of the Suez in the Mid-East October War (also called the Yom Kippur War, or the 
Ramadan War) to name a few.  This paper is more inclined to look at the so-called “unconventional” 
surprise attacks, such as that which had occurred on 9/11/01; Al-Qa’ida vs. the U.S.   There have been 
many cases of successful conventional surprise attack in the past century.  Though an initial advantage was 
tactically successful, what stands out about the history of surprise attacks teaches us that the short term 
gains are usually followed by a long term strategic loss.  Still, the initial shock value is enough to cause the 
public to inquire as to the causal origins.  The public record indicates that it is gauged as an intelligence 
failure and through this prism an inquiry is undertaken.   We shall address this matter in the coming pages. 
46 Wohlstetter, “Pearl Harbor”; p. 393. 
22 
 
It has been further argued that perhaps equal parts blame are to be found in both 
the analysis and decision sides of the equation.  In a study of the Beirut bombings of the 
U.S. Marine Barracks and State Department, Erik J. Dahl has argued that lack of 
“focused imagination” had been significant despite adequate intelligence47.  Dahl argues 
that analysts and consumers were not imaginative enough to have recognized a shift in 
tactics that would have revealed the changed threat environment.  Subsequently, in the 
link between producers and consumers the emerging unconventional threat was not 
adequately communicated:   
Most of the classical problems associated with warning and surprise were, however, 
evident: cognitive limitations prevented analysts and decision-makers from even 
imagining what they were facing, while modern intelligence and communications 
technology produced a numbing overabundance of information.  The verdict of history 
has largely cleared the intelligence community of significant blame in this case, 
supporting the orthodox view that warning of terrorist attack is extraordinarily difficult 
and failure can only be expected.  But this is wrong, for our case study indicates the 
intelligence community must share an equal portion of the responsibility, both for passing 
on a flood of intelligence data without conducting the necessary analysis, and - just as 
important – for not ensuring that the intelligence was being received and understood 
properly by commanders.48 
The “Fault” Lines 
The “ambiguous language of intelligence”49 is an outgrowth of the somewhat 
speculative nature of intelligence analysis50, which in turn hinders the degree of certainty 
                                                            
47 Erik J. Dahl, “Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism”, The Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 31-55, February 2005. 
48 Ibid.; p. 49. 
49 Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, Ephraim Kam, (Cambridge, MA/London, England:  Harvard 
University Press, 1988, reprinted in paperback 2004); p. 24.   
50 One delineation to make with regard to analysis is related to its subdivision into two categories:  
Substantiated analysis and speculative analysis.  The former indicates “exact, verified, and up-to-date data”, 
as the latter is “based on a generally good acquaintance with the other side’s way of thinking and past 
behavior”; Shlomo Gazit, “Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work”, International Security, 
Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring, 1982) 36-56; quote from p. 44.  This may present a source of some difficulty for the 
consumer, who is attempting to discern truth.  The analyst may choose to indicate whether they are 
informed by scientific knowledge (substantiated) or reasonable wisdom-based knowledge (speculative).  
The article highlights many of the complexities within the relationship between producers and consumers. 
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that the consumer may place in the assessments they make based on intelligence 
products51.  In the interplay between decision makers and intelligence producers, 
Ephraim Kam suggests that there are three injurious effects that tend to obstruct the 
intelligence process: 
1-“…analysts are not always sensitive to the needs of decision makers and do not 
properly direct their production toward issues that are important to policy.” 
2- “…intelligence analysts find it difficult to assess and predict the enemy’s intentions 
and willingness to take risks since these depend to a large extent on their own 
government’s future moves.” 
3- “… intelligence analysts are sometimes unaware of the costs and benefits of their own 
assessment, especially when the issue is as critical as predicting a coming war.”52 
 
Moreover, the burden placed on decision makers is very acute, and has far-
reaching consequences.  It is they who must choose wisely from among the multitude of 
possibilities in order to formulate the appropriate policies and countermeasures53.  This 
challenge further strengthens as the decision makers have little time to devote to finished 
intelligence products54.   
                                                            
51 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, p. 28.  There is much evidence of the friction between intelligence 
producers and consumers.  Shulsky and Shmitt have observed that this can be due to several factors.  
Namely, that policymakers become upset when intelligence fails to be fully supportive of policy, the 
dependent (as opposed to independent) relationship that the IC has with policymakers, and the perceived 
level of expertise that may or may not exist at either end of the spectrum.  Therefore, they argue that the 
only way to insulate the IC from policymakers is to have service chiefs with the “…willingness and ability 
to protect analysts from outside pressure.”    Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 
Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, 3rd ed., (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2002); pp. 133-141. 
52 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, pp. 207-208.  Though these three effects describe a conventional 
environment it is worth considering that such differences exist between the two realms.  This illustrates the 
required division of labor and their unintended impact.  These are by no means the only impediments to 
effective intelligence analysis.  Others, such as those related to conceptual rigidity, are explored a bit later 
in this paper ; pp. 85-114.   
53 Ibid.; pp. 211-212. 
54 This is a recurring theme in the study of intelligence failures, as Roger Hilsman had studied in the early 
days of the IC’s codified existence.  See Roger Hilsman, Jr., “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign 
Affairs”, World Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Oct., 1952), 1-45.  This point is made on pp. 11-13, and 37.  
Hilsman also treats producers’ and consumers’ lack of introspection with the prescription that both ends 
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There are inherent impediments within the “intelligence cycle”55 that pertain to 
every step in the process.  As this paper is naturally unable to address them all, there is an 
area in which to focus: the nexus between the policy-minded consumers and the 
managing body of the producers56.  Whereas “politicization” is normally considered to be 
a pejorative term, Richard Betts relaxes the definition to incorporate a sense of 
normalcy57.  It is the concept, that since policy drives intelligence and in turn, intelligence 
informs policymakers, there are naturally going to be political players on the 
consumption side of the equation.   
It is important to note that politicization is not equivalent to corruption.  That 
would be the extreme form of politics meddling in intelligence affairs.  Rather, it is the 
appreciation of its presence that analysts, particularly managers, must bear in mind when 
editing intelligence products.  As politicization can’t be eliminated, awareness of its 
existence may provide the managers in the IC to be in a position to reduce its harmful 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
must not only consider the source of their own biases, but that “At the same time the researchers must 
become policy-oriented.” p. 43.  Again, this is a recurring theme:  Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and 
Power in American National Security, Richard K. Betts, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); p. 
40. 
55 Traditionally, the “intelligence cycle” starts with Planning and Direction, based on policymakers’ needs.  
It then flows to Collection, Processing and Exploitation, then Analysis and Production, Dissemination, and 
presumably back to Planning and Direction.  While the “cycle” refers to a seemingly cyclical pattern, it is 
somewhat incomplete.  There are times in which feedback and policy needs dictate that the cycle revert 
back to an earlier stage, for instance Analysis and Production.  It may therefore be better to illustrate the 
“cycle” in a more linear fashion.  See Lowenthal, Intelligence; (Third edition, 2006), pp. 65-67. 
56 Following the surprise nuclear tests by India in 1998, Melvin Goodman wrote, “The Indian fiasco has 
exposed the three major deficiencies evident at the CIA for the past several years: politicization, 
bureaucratization, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the proper interaction between intelligence and 
policymaking.”  “US intelligence failure shows need for reform”, Christian Science Monitor, 08827729, 18 
May, 1998, Vol. 90, Issue 120. 
57 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence; pp. 76-79.  One aspect of politicization is of interest here, and that is the 
explicitly stated object of inquiry was to determine if politicization was at play in the Iraq WMD 
investigation.  The inquiry began in 2003 with pronouncements that policymakers not only misused 
intelligence, but that they had manipulated it to improve its suitability with policy preferences.  The fact 
that this allegation was made by Democratic opponents against the Republican administration implies that 
there is some preliminary political shading that fuels such an inquiry.  On the other side of the coin, the 
Republican administration used Executive Privilege to circumvent such charges.  See “Robust Intelligence 
Oversight Stalls at White House Door”, Helen Fessenden, CQ Weekly; 26 July 2003, Vol. 61 Issue 30, p. 
1917, 5p, 2bw. 
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effects58.  So too may their subordinates and superiors, as well as the consuming 
policymakers.   
The criticism of DCIs past has been either that they are too close to the president 
and/or his most influential policymaking circle, or that the president shuns them.  Betts 
has suggested that the solution is probably not realistic, but nonetheless it is a solution of 
sorts: 
There is a solution to this dilemma in theory, although not in legislation: select a 
president and an intelligence director with particular personality traits.  The best chief of 
intelligence is one who has the personal confidence and trust of the president, but who 
delights in telling the inner circle what it does not want to hear.  This relationship can be 
sustained, of course, only if the president likes to have his thinking challenged and his job 
complicated- something more common among intellectuals than among politicians.59 
Impediments 
Cognitive Impediments 
 As mentioned above, delving into the intricacies of the “intelligence cycle” is not 
a priority here.  However, many of the problems within the cycle seem to indicate that 
they affect both producers and consumers.  Since we are exploring the zone between the 
two, it is important to discuss what some of the seemingly irreducible cognitive barriers 
are, that may influence both.  Richards J. Heuer Jr. has illuminated many of these within 
the context of deception, a key element in any surprise attack60.  Though Heuer had 
                                                            
58 Ibid.; While managers may be mindful of politics, it is ultimately the DCI (Director of Central 
Intelligence) and the DNI (Director of National Intelligence- a position that was recommended for decades, 
but was not implemented until again it was recommended in the Terrorism and Prevention Act of 2004) 
who have the president’s ear.  It would not be incorrect to say that they are political actors to some degree 
as well.  
59 “The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This Time?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3 
(May/June 2004) 2-8.  This quote was drawn from pp. 7-8. 
60 Richards J. Heuer, Jr.  “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach”, 




focused on the destructive forces militating against analysts’ perceptions, it is certainly 
applicable to the policymakers as well61.   
 The inelasticity of mental frameworks tends to withstand discrepant information, 
which in turn is advantageous for the attacking party.  It is far easier to deceive an 
adversary if one is exploiting the victim’s presumptions, rather than luring them into a 
different set of preconceptions62.  The existence of such a rigid set of biases is an 
outgrowth of the need to establish order in one’s thinking, so that the human need to 
understand the world around them may yield the genesis of causality and perhaps a vision 
of what is to come63.   
A couple of interesting facts were discovered in a study of international crises, as 
they relate to the policymakers’ role.  “The most commonly observed symptom was 
failure to reevaluate alternatives, which was found in 15 of the 19 cases” 64. This 
cognitive rigidity sets the stage for disaster.  In other words, even given adequate 
intelligence that a crisis will unfold, policymakers may choose to cling to what is most 
comfortable.  Secondly, “individuals who display a capability for analytic decision 
making do not always use it.”65   
In another area of study regarding premature cognitive closure, Uri Bar-Joseph 
and Arie W. Kruglanski have identified two types of needs associated with either 
                                                            
61 Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976).  Jervis had made this point specifically in his tremendously rich study of decision-makers’ 
ignorance of the historical record, as having incorrectly learned from surprise attacks- among other jolts to 
the system; owing in part to their cognitive recalcitrance.  This is evident on pp. 218, 224-225, 237, and 
307.   
62 Heuer, “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception”;  pp. 298, 304 and 317-318. 
63 Ibid.; pp. 310, 314 and 322-323. 
64 Gregory M. Herek; Irving L. Janis; Paul Huth, “Decision Making during International Crises: Is Quality 
of Process Related to Outcome?”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), 203-
226); p. 214. 
65 Ibid.; p. 215. 
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personality, position, or both, that are observable66.  First, is the “urgency principle” 
(“seizing”); the imperative time constraints that demand quick closure.  The second is the 
“permanence principle” (“freezing”); the notion that once closure has been made, 
inconsistent evidence will be deflected as insignificant, or it may be misinterpreted to 
conform to the established intransigent schema67.  What exacerbates these effects, 
according to Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski, is the sense of prestige and influence that one 
may have within the halls of power68.  This may also trickle down, if even in subtle form, 
from authoritative personalities to their subordinate members69.  In the case of the Iraq 
WMD “failure” (discussed shortly), it may have had a similar systemic impact.  This 
seems to be in consonance with Zegart’s assertions of causality for adaptation failure 
(discussed earlier).    
Systemic Impediments 
One way to envision the distinction between policy and intelligence is to see them as two 
spheres of government activity that are separated by a semipermeable membrane.  The 
membrane is semipermeable because policymakers can and do cross over into the 
intelligence sphere, but intelligence officials cannot cross over into the policy sphere. 
-Mark M. Lowenthal70 
 
 The above quote represents the unilateral boundary crossing that characterizes the 
dynamics of subordination.  One implication of this dynamic seems to be that in a 
subordinate-superior relationship the former will be more likely reticent than the latter.  
Historically, the relationship that the president and his staff have had with the DCI 
                                                            
66 “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise”, 
Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski, Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003; pp. 75-99. 
67 Ibid.; both points are found on p. 81. 
68 Ibid.; p. 82. 
69 Ibid.; p. 81.  On p. 84 they illustrate this adverse impact very convincingly. 
70 As cited above, Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy (Third Ed.); p. 4, with a diagram on p. 5. 
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explains much of the executive branch’s influence on “face time”, or lack thereof.  It 
seems to be a function of personal like/dislike between the two that impedes successful 
national security policy formulation and implementation71.  This may explain why some 
intelligence is (mis)used and some is (dis)pleasing to policymakers.   
There is another point worth bearing in mind, in that each of the national security 
members of the intelligence cycle are bound by certain realities, stemming from the 
anarchic structure of international relations.  Therefore, clinging to the comfort of a 
policy that has been proven useful in the past is a natural tendency that is hard to alter, 
much less eliminate.  The inherent condition of uncertainty in international relations often 
inhibits policymakers’ imagination and restricts their menu of choice in order to cope 
with it:  
Most foreign policy is based on a high degree of continuity, inertia, and incremental 
decision-making that is rarely questioned by those who participate in the implementation 
process.  Nevertheless, it is often claimed that ‘the uncertain nature of international 
affairs creates a demand for flexibility as a safety valve.’  In reality, the shapers of 
foreign policy seldom avail themselves of this safety valve.  Instead of exploring new, 
imaginative courses of action in order to cope with uncertainty, political leaders usually 
cling to the ‘security’ of well-known policies.72   
                                                            
71 “Managing the Intelligence Community”, Stephen J. Flanagan, International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(Summer, 1985), 58-95; see pp. 67-68, 73, and 88 for a discussion of this topic.  Also, for the below matter 
concerning bureaucratic politics and rivalries, Flanagan discusses these themes throughout; particularly on 
pp. 73, 75, 78-80, 82, 85-86, 88-89.  Graham T. Allison has recalled how DCI John McCone was seen by 
President Kennedy to have been hawkish in the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis in “Conceptual Models 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), p. 712: 
“What the President least wanted to hear, the CIA was most hesitant to say plainly.  On August 22 John 
McCone met privately with the President and voiced suspicions that the Soviets were preparing to 
introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.  Kennedy heard this as what it was: the suspicion of a hawk.  
McCone left Washington for a month’s honeymoon on the Riviera.”  The distinction between “offensive” 
and “defensive” weapons was created by the Kennedy Administration. 
72 Michael I. Handel, “Surprise and Change in International Politics”, International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 
(Spring, 1980), 57-85; p. 59, emphasis added.  Though this was a study of “diplomatic surprise” the idea of 
playing it safe by sticking to a potentially outmoded paradigm seems to be a common practice among 
policymakers.  David Corn highlights the difficulty in secretive organizations, “How do you get any 
bureaucracy- particularly a clandestine one- to behave creatively and responsibly?  Inertia and infighting 
have often derailed well-intentioned intelligence reform…”  See “Impaired Intelligence”, David Corn, The 




 It seems that the genesis of policymakers’ conceptual rigidity appears to be a 
product of subconscious necessity in coping with ambiguity, and not a result of 
consciously adopting the most optimal choice from among competing policy 
alternatives73.  This appears to be a key element to consider, as it bolsters Zegart’s causal 
logic; mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
Turf wars are also palpable at every level.  Such impediments seem to further 
hamper clarity and infect the decision-making process.  For national security bureaucrats, 
turf is often a major concern; yet it is to the detriment of national security itself.  “A 
government agency that surrenders turf, even turf it doesn’t particularly want, signals 
weaknesses that may invite further raids by competing agencies, as the CIA is learning to 
its sorrow.”74 
This last point should not be taken lightly; as it illustrates the conditions under 
which the national security apparatus was constructed following The Second World War.  
Its persistence also informs the debates on reorganization that had followed each 
commission charged with investigating subsequent “intelligence failures.”75 
Organizational Tendencies and Political Realities 
                                                            
73 The cognitive limitations of the human mind, time, and available information (in our case, intelligence) 
have been noted by James March and Herbert Simon (among others) as salient factors in creating the 
bounded rationality within which decision makers must operate.  Their works will be cited in the final 
chapter. 
74 Remaking Domestic Intelligence, Richard A. Posner, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 2005), p. 29. 
75 See Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC, Amy B. Zegart (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999).  This work will be referenced again, near the end of this chapter. 
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One’s organizational association also accounts for the mental set to which 
members tend to cling76.  Organizations have their own culture77.  Their members are 
most likely to view problems, causation and perhaps solutions through such a cultural 
prism78.  If an organization is suited to adaptation, it is a function of humility and 
learning how to learn that will galvanize its evolution79.   
Members of an organization, particularly career officials, come to believe that the health 
of their organization is vital to the national interest.  The health of the organization, in 
turn, is seen to depend on maintaining influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the 
necessary capabilities.80 
 This leads to the topic of organizational learning, which will be revisited in the 
following chapter.  Graham Allison has built on the work of James March and Herbert 
Simon (among others) that informs us of the means through which change (read: 
                                                            
76 Heur, “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception”, p. 323.  There is also an appealing quality of 
belonging to an elite organization.  One may sense that in insulating and protecting the organization’s focus 
becomes less and less attached to the rationale that established its existence.  This point is generally 
formulated from a variety of sources, of which one stands out: “An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy”, 
Phillip Selznick, American Sociological Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, (Feb., 1943), pp. 47-54. 
77 Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, James Q. Wilson, (US: Basic Books, 
1989).  Insofar as “organizational culture” is concerned, Wilson defines the term as “… a persistent, 
patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.  
Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual.” See p. 91. 
78 How organizations view themselves in terms of where they fit in is a point to consider.  For instance, in 
the pre-9/11 world the FBI had not truly viewed itself, “…as part of the national security apparatus and did 
not share information with the national security community.”   See “Strategic Surprise and the September 
11 Attacks”, Daniel Byman, Annual Review of Political Science, 2005; 8: 145-170, quote on p. 159.  
Byman also stresses that CIA had logically focused where they were mandated to: outside of the U.S.   
79 The preceding sentences are an attempt to summarize Schein’s work on organizational adaptation and 
becoming a perpetual learning organization.  Organizational Culture and Leadership, Edgar H. Schein 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, third edition, 2004); pp. 88, 97, 108, 389-397. Jack S. Levy describes the 
complexities of the organizational learning process, which must start with the individual in the 
organization.  See Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield”, 
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), 279-312.  Exactly how complex is discussed on 
pp. 283- 289. 
80 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications”, World Politics, Vol.24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations, (Spring, 
1972), p. 48.  They also apply this idea to intelligence organizations on p. 59, “Intelligence organizations 
are not perfect and neutral transmission belts.  They notice what their images of the world lead them to 
think will be important to senior players.  They report events and options according to established 
procedures and in ways designed to protect their own organizational interests.”  The next chapter will 
address this matter with regard to the military; here is a primer from p. 49, “Organizational interests are 
often dominated by the desire to maintain the autonomy of the organization in pursuing what its members 
view as the essence of the organization’s activity, e.g., flying for the Air Force.” 
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adaptation) takes place.  Allison has made the point that changes do occur in 
organizations, but “Learning occurs gradually, over time.  Dramatic organizational 
change occurs in response to major disasters.”81 
 For all the recommendations that have been made for reforming the IC over the 
second half of the 20th Century, few have centered on “understanding the basic mission of 
intelligence and how it must adapt to changes in the larger society, economy and global 
environment”82.  The “containment” organizing principle83 that guided national security 
concerns throughout the Cold War had not yielded an equally concise concept during the 
post-Cold War “Information Age.”   Therefore, re-organizing a community that has an 
embedded culture is perhaps the hardest task of all84.  As Berkowitz and Goodman have 
stated, “Whether the intelligence community will adapt to the Information Age depends 
much on whether its culture can adapt.  The record of bureaucracies adapting to changing 
conditions is not encouraging.  Bureaucracies are insulated from most of the forces that 
make other organizations adapt.”85 
                                                            
81 Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham T. Allison, (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1971); p. 68.  Some of the accelerating conditions of organizational learning and change are: 
budgetary feast, prolonged budgetary failure and dramatic performance failures (as repeated on p. 85: 
“Dramatic change occurs usually in response to major disasters”). 
82 Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age, Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); pp. 27-28, emphasis added. 
83 Ibid.; p. 3. 
84 Ibid.; pp. 63, 67, 71.  The IC is what Berkowitz and Goodman have termed to be a “protected cartel in 
the government bureaucracy” (p. 54), whose culture (p. 80) is defined by secrecy (p. 149), thus making it 
uniquely inhospitable to the Information Age (p. 151), which revolves around openness and networking.   
85 Ibid.; p. 165.  Berkowitz and Goodman also offer the prophetic wisdom that either the bureaucracy will 
become irrelevant, or it will “muddle along until a catastrophe exposes the organization’s unseen 
weaknesses” (also on p. 165).  Elsewhere, Berkowitz and Goodman discuss the problems that secrecy and 
compartmentalization produces within the IC and between the IC and the policymakers.  The secrecy 
aspect cuts both ways, in that policymakers often do not reveal what they have learned through their own 
investigations.  Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), Chapter Five: “Intelligence and Problems of Organization”, pp. 110- 136.  
Berkowitz has also suggested that successful private sector business practices should be applied to the IC’s 
interaction with policymakers.  “Better Ways to Fix U.S. Intelligence”, Bruce Berkowitz, Orbis, 00304387, 
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 Charles Perrow has noted that “Politics changes drastically when large 
organizations appear.  Politicians come from them, work through them, and are beholden 
to them.”86  That being said, national security bureaucracies do exhibit some of the 
negative qualities mentioned above.  Still, this paper is not taking a cynical view of 
bureaucracies; rather it is placing them in context, so that the reader may see more clearly 
the inefficiencies that tend to inhibit the adaptation process.  Bureaucracies should not be 
viewed with an absolute contempt for their existence, but with an understanding of their 
origins, roles, and interconnectedness to policy and society.  In a related point, Perrow 
argues the following: 
Bureaucracy was not a demonic invention of evil elites; it simply offered elites an assist 
that gave them unprecedented (but anticipated) control over the society, given the scope 
and complexity of that society, since it provided such exquisite control over the 
institutions that were absorbing society- the bureaucracies they were establishing.87 
 
This paper is not so much about organizations as it is about how adaptation is 
enabled, or disabled.  In this chapter there is some discussion of the organizational 
learning that has or has not taken place within the IC, as it relates to changes in the threat 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Fall 2001, Vol. 45, Issue 4.  This was also discussed in Best Truth, referenced as a “Virtual Corporation” 
(pp. 75-82) and “Market-Based Management” (pp. 82-83).   
86 “A society of organizations”, Charles Perrow, Theory and Society, 20: 725-762, 1991; p. 726.  In his 
study of “factory bureaucracy” Perrow had claimed that “… the term ‘bureaucracy’ is virtually 
synonymous with organizations.” P. 729.  Herbert Simon has defined “organizations” as “systems of 
interrelated roles” (and the term “role” as a “system of prescribed decision premises”).  See “Bounded 
Rationality and Organizational Learning”, Herbert A. Simon, Organization Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Special 
Issue: Organizational Learning: Papers in Honor of (and by) James G. March (1991), pp. 125-134; the 
above was cited from p. 126.  He also states, “A major topic, therefore, in organizational learning is an 
understanding of the mechanisms that can be used to enable an organization to deviate from the culture in 
which it is embedded”; p. 128.  This is an important point, as organizational learning may be influenced by 
both internal and external forces.  No less significant to emphasize here is that knowledge of history 
doesn’t necessarily mean that learning the correct lessons automatically follows.  “Even within a single 
organization, there are severe limitations to organizational learning as an instrument of intelligence.  
Learning does not always lead to intelligent behavior.” See Barbara Levitt and James G. March, 
“Organizational Learning”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 14 (1988), p. 335. 
87 Perrow, “A society of organizations”, p. 743. 
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environment.  The next chapter looks at how the defense establishment has or has not 
been adaptable in relation to unconventional war fighting.  This discourse is meant to set 
the stage for understanding what forces lay outside the control of the organization that 
may be more significant to study; namely, strategic choices and mechanisms that promote 
or prevent adaptation.       
Two Cases: Iran and Iraq 
 In a recently declassified postmortem on the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Iraq 
WMD debacle (not yet fully declassified), Robert Jervis has produced a most insightful 
and honest accounting of the CIA’s missteps.  What is equally important, are the reasons 
for failure that reside in both the political sphere as well as the analytical realm88.  There 
are a number of key points that lend credence to Zegart’s findings that politics more often 
are at fault than the IC itself.  Though this seems to be a correct assessment of the Iraqi 
WMD mishap, the opposite seems to be correct for the Iranian Revolution’s emergence.  
The messy middle ground between producers and consumers is explored with some 
depth.  Both cases are useful for understanding how the IC is able to fail.  To better 
summarize Jervis’s findings it may be useful to bullet them below. 
The Iranian Revolution (Failure from within the IC?) 
• Neither the analysts, nor the policymakers applied the social science 
methodological approach to intelligence.  “… CIA officers writing on Iran were 
                                                            
88 Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War, Robert Jervis (Ithica and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2010).  The book is a rich source within which the student of 
intelligence failures may find the keys to unlocking the often over-classified postmortems that may be 
inaccessible.   
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more like journalists than social scientists.”89  Peer review was not viewed as a 
valuable endeavor.  It was to their estimative detriment.   
• The IC had been linguistically challenged in that there were “… almost no 
Americans on the scene [who] spoke good Farsi.”90  Though cables from the State 
Department’s in-country personnel were on the mark, it went unnoticed at CIA. 
• The expectation that the Shah would eventually engage the growing unrest by 
military suppression was based on his past performances (as recent as 1977), 
which did not take into account his more recent character changes. 91  It was 
logical, but ultimately erroneous. 
• Policymakers devote their time to the most pressing issues of the day.  As the 
Iranian unrest was viewed as mostly blowing off steam, it was not of immediate 
concern to policymakers, which in turn explains CIA’s lack of dedication to the 
protesters92. 
                                                            
89 Ibid.; p. 23. 
90 Ibid.; p. 18.  This lack of sufficient language (and cultural) skills has never really gone away.  It has been 
observed to be a major deficiency of the IC, as highlighted by numerous commissions charged with 
studying intelligence failures.  If one consults the bulk of recommendations made by Congress and other 
students of intelligence, they will find that this point is raised and repeated more than most others.   Still, 
there seems to be little effort to ameliorate this condition on a grand scale. 
91 As Jervis notes, the Shah was said to have appeared to be “vulnerable”, as his conciliatory gestures to the 
opposition were viewed as an indicator of his impotence, further emboldening them (p. 71).  The Shah was 
reported to have appeared “frightened and upset; no longer exud[ing] confidence”; descriptions of his 
response to the latest round of protests as “indecisiveness, nervousness and imprecision” (p. 93- in 
quotations in the original).  It was noted that he had appeared “weak and indecisive” (p. 94- quotations in 
the original); “depressed, nervous, dispirited, uncertain” (p. 95); and there was the sense even as his 
position had not been reported to be in question, his “…underlying doubts about his worth” were noted in 
November 1977 (p. 95- quotations in the original).  The Iranian elite perceived these characteristics, but it 
is curious that it was included in a number of reports, yet not to have stood out as a significant anomaly.  It 
was perhaps a function of disregarding information that clashed with the long-held confidence in the Shah, 
that would have been viewed as discrepant information and psychologically discomforting to the analysts.   
92 Ibid.; This point was discussed further on pp. 46-48. 
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• Open-source (OSINT in IC parlance) sources and interaction with the universe of 
academic experts would most likely have produced some key disconfirming 
evidence to generate the discovery of alternative explanations.   
• Both analysts and policymakers had mistakenly judged the Shah’s liberalization 
program as being beneficial to his population; mirror imaging can be a dangerous 
blunder.  Though the Shah’s main concern was the handover of his throne and 
rule to his son, it clashed with his desire to westernize his country.  Further, his 
drive to liberalize more rapidly seems to have caused social displacement93.   
• There was a faulty belief that the protest movement would somehow divide into 
factions that were easier to suppress.  This never happened.   
• The role of religion was underestimated in Iranian society.  Related to the above 
conjecture that the factions would split was the surprise that Ayatollah Khomeini 
had managed to subjugate his co-religionist Ayatollahs.  What was even more 
surprising was that the central role of religion had the effect of solidarity on the 
populace.  As the Shah was viewed as the worse of two evils, Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s strong faction was appealing not so much for its religiosity, but for its 
revolutionary appeal to the poor.  Even the secular elites realized reluctantly that 
if they didn’t get on board bad things could happen to them. 
• The analysts had never realized how much the Shah’s subjects had hated him.   
• The fact that there were so many demonstrations may have dulled their 
significance to the analysts.  In other words, there was a sense that the common 
                                                            
93 Ibid. ; p. 63. 
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practice of public protestation had not been cause for alarm, but rather a 
reaffirmation of views already held about Iranian society.    
• The intra-IC sharing and challenging of assumptions was mostly absent.  
(Economic analysts and political analysts seemed not to posit their own sense of 
the situation, so that their contradictory assumptions did not produce the requisite 
analytical discord that may yield a more comprehensive and accurate depiction of 
the breadth and depth of the disorder in Iran). 
 
There were many reasons why the fall of the Shah was missed by Western 
intelligence (read: American IC).  Culturally there was difficulty understanding how 
religion could play such a central role in politics, as it was generally viewed in the West 
as two influences that should not cross paths (a secular bias)94.  In fact, one could say that 
religious leaders in Iran are analogous to Congressmen in the U.S95.  They are the 
spokespersons for the voiceless, and they operate with the knowledge that their 
repression would be very costly for the government.   
The Shah’s liberalization policies seemed to have been running counter to his 
autocratic rule.  There appears to have been a direct relationship between the speed of 
reform and the intensity of civil unrest.  Further, though the Shah’s self-image had been 
                                                            
94 Ibid.; p. 87.  This was not only an erroneous view held by the producers, but the consumers as well.  “… 
large numbers of people hated the Shah and viewed the religious movement opposition as the symbol of 
and carrier for opposition to the regime.”  p. 105.  
95 Ibid.; p. 90.  It should be noted that Jervis does not say this directly.  It is merely an inference. 
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deteriorating (along with his physical health), he appeared to cling to the idea that his rule 
was benign96.    
Jervis had explored the possible effects of policy bias on the analysts, but was not 
able to detect a patent influence97.  It is in the dissenting remarks from senior members of 
CIA that supports the idea that politics mattered just as much- perhaps more than, the 
analytical failings.  Bruce Palmer is rather critical of the postmortem: 
... the analysis did not delve very deeply into US policy aspects which had enormous 
influence over both the analytical and operational/collection sides of the Intelligence 
Community.  Thus, a broader examination of the matter would no doubt lead to some much 
different conclusions.  In my own view, our ‘failure’ in Iran was considerably more one of a 
policy nature, to include the lack of adequate policy-intelligence linkage, than an intelligence 
breakdown.98 
  
 Though Klaus Knorr agrees that policy influence was not discovered, he does 
concede that it is possible that it has yet to be discerned: 
US policy toward the Shah may well have had a major impact on Iranian developments.  
In ways as yet unclear and speculative, the intelligence failure may have resulted in part 
from this policy, (a) in terms of structuring attention to Iranian realities and the 
procurement of information; (b) in terms of discouraging intelligence analysts from 
pursuing questions that might have been, or were felt to be,  uncomfortable to 
policymakers (because they were assumed to cross the boundary between intelligence 
and policymaking) and (c)- and perhaps most of all- because US policy helped to bring 
about the actual course of events in Iran.99  
 
                                                            
96 Ibid.; pp. 93-94. 
97 Ibid.; pp. 106-107.  The policy bias refers to the American support for the Shah’s government and its 
implied beneficence, juxtaposed with American human rights policy, which may have subdued the 
perception of the Shah as overly oppressive.  It should also be noted that the revolution was viewed as an 
anomaly by most, and hence a search for patterns that would have led to it were not considered.  Not 
everyone agreed with this judgment.  What is rather unique in this case is the input of the members of 
NFAC (National Foreign Assessment Center [preceded and supplanted by the DI- Directorate of 
Intelligence]).  Klaus Knorr (p. 109) agrees with Jervis, whereas David Blee recalls, “… the DIA 
representatives were under orders to oppose my title, ‘Iran: How Reliable an Ally?’ because it seemed to 
cast doubt on the wisdom of our military aid program.”(p. 112).  
98 Ibid.; p. 114.  Both emphases were added by your author. 
99 Ibid. ; pp. 115-116. 
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Knorr makes another point in the above.  Item “(b)” indicates the sensitive subject 
of boundaries and a potential for not wanting to cross them, in an effort to stay true to the 
singular mission to report and not meddle in policymaking.   William Leonhart highlights 
the “relation between policy and analysis.”100  His view is that the collaboration between 
the two was profitable to some extent: 
It does not seem to have occurred to the authors that a closer relationship between 
policymakers and the Intelligence Community might have had advantages in assessing 
the implications or consequences of policy options before decisions were taken on the 
directions and use of US influence.101 
 
 Leonhart continues his criticism of the postmortem by underscoring the authors’ 
biases, and its transference to the postmortem: 
These reflections seem part of those ‘general beliefs’, about which the authors dilate 
elsewhere, that they feel largely pre-determined the subsequent analysis of the Iranian 
problem.  Their view of analysts, particularly those at senior level, seems curiously 
constricted.  But those who hold similar organizational preferences will no doubt be more 
responsive to the line of criticism which the authors make of NFAC performance during 
the period reviewed- criticism which in turn generally reinforce their predilections on 
desirable organizational mold.  The point is not so much that the authors’ arguments are 
right or wrong, but that their implicit assumption appears to color much of their own 
analysis.”102 
 
 In essence, the postmortem of the Iranian Revolution seems to indicate that there 
is some politicization, but it appears to different participants in different forms and 
degrees of influence. 
The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure (Comprehensive Failure?) 
                                                            
100 Ibid.; p. 117. 
101 Ibid.; p. 117, emphasis in the original. 
102 Ibid.; p. 119. 
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It has been suggested that whereas the IC had failed on 11 September, 2001 to 
deliver enough warning, in the case of the Iraqi WMDs it had over-compensated by 
“providing too much.”103  As it was suggested earlier in this paper, focusing on intentions 
rather than capabilities is a more arduous task.  The failure to discover WMDs in Iraq 
was a consequence of the failure to understand intentions, while focused on capabilities.  
Further sustaining this supposition was the secretive tone that Saddam Hussein had 
maintained, while attempting to circumvent UN resolutions to stop the flow of non-
emergency goods.  It was later learned that Hussein had simply wanted this uncertainty to 
deter his nemesis: Iran.  This failure was influenced by the specious belief that he had 
been pursuing a WMD program, as well as the attendant stockpiles, and associated 
equipment to produce WMDs.  Jervis argues that the conclusions reached about the 
existence of Saddam’s WMD program was logical.  Absent any strong disconfirming 
evidence, the same conclusion may have been reached, irrespective of the shock of 11 
September.  Whatever the policymakers would have decided was not for the IC to 
influence.    
The surreptitious procurement procedures that Hussein had used to acquire what 
was determined to be single-use weapons material had encouraged the theory that he had 
something to hide.  Both the political and intelligence communities shared this mistaken 
assumption.  Each one seems to have had a reinforcing effect upon the other.  One could 
conclude that the policy-intelligence relationship had been corrupted to some degree.  If 
so, this would exemplify the negative form of politicization104.  Robert Jervis has 
                                                            
103 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, p. 104. 
104 Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails (cited earlier).  It appears that politicization was a very subtle force, and 
that it had been more palpable after a decision was already made to invade Iraq; pp. 131-136.  To be fair, 
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criticized the received wisdom that the IC was improperly reliant on the Western 
consensus (Britain, Australia, etc.).  He claims that the investigation that had followed the 
“intelligence failure” was flawed for the same reasons as the original failure that was 
being investigated: “the postmortems neglected social science methods, settled for more 
intuitive but less adequate ways of thinking, and jumped to plausible but misleading 
conclusions.”105 
Connecting the Dots 
External Loci of Responsibility 
Insofar as “adaptation” is concerned, it appears that “overlearning” from past 
mistakes had occurred.106  With the 11 September attacks being such a recent and 
impactful event it would have naturally provided an incentive to adapt to the new threat 
environment as it was believed to be.  This led to over-correcting the warning function 
regarding the new threat.  The resultant stress placed on the IC had contributed to 
“…premature cognitive closure.”107  This created an atmosphere conducive to 
misadventures.   
Further, given that intelligence serves policy, any potential alternative 
explanations would have been difficult to impart for two reasons.  First, there were 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
on 21 June, 2006, DNI (Director of National Intelligence) John D. Negroponte did respond to the Chairman 
of the House Permanent Select Committee Pete Hoekstra’s request for a declassified “key points” 
memoranda summarizing NGIC’s (National Ground Intelligence Center) findings.  Most of the points had 
consisted of the common conjecture linking terrorists’ pursuits to acquire WMD with the WMD that 
actually was recovered.  However, the DNI did state in his opening point that, “Since 2003 Coalition forces 
have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve 
agent.”  Still, the recovery of a degraded inventory merely implies that there were weapons at one point, but 
does not have the force of claiming that there is a current stockpile. 
105 Ibid.; p. 123. 
106 Ibid.; pp. 138-139. 
107 Ibid.; pp. 144. 
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weaker indicators that Saddam’s WMD program was dead; however, such a possibility 
that could not provide strong disconfirming evidence would have been costly.  It would 
have conflicted profoundly with the administration’s view of Iraq in the context of the 
post-9/11 threat environment.  As Steve Chan notes, “… to some extent decision makers 
legitimately discount warnings from dubious sources (e.g., Cuban refugees, spies like 
Richard Sorge), sources which are ideologically suspicious (e.g., Churchill and Roosevelt 
for Stalin, Panikkar for Truman), or sources with a track record of false alarms…”108   
The obverse side of the coin explains the subtle, yet ever-present recognition of 
one’s position and purpose relative to the consuming powers that be: 
Like other bureaucrats, intelligence analysts have to conform to the regime’s basic views 
about the nature and morality of international relations if they wish to be treated as 
‘responsible’ and ‘serious’.  Therefore, they refrain from asking the really ‘tough’ but 
crucial questions such as the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, the morality of the 
Vietnam War, and the validity of the ‘domino theory.’109 
Being that the IC was alleged to have blundered in 2001, as a result of not having 
had enough confirmatory evidence, it was rather hesitant to commit the same error again.  
(As mentioned above, 9/11 was more a failure to connect the dots, whereas the Iraq 
WMD debacle was the result of an overabundance of dots that were hastily connected- or 
misconnected).    
Secondly, there was a sense that the upper echelons of political power had their 
own “reliable” sources that were in keeping with the assessment that Saddam posed a 
grave risk to U.S. interests in the region.  The cost of making a weak case that the 
                                                            
108 Steve Chan, “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning”, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), 171-180; p. 172. 
109 Ibid.; p. 178.   
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administration was wrong would have caused political and psychological discomfort and 
might have risked calling into question the IC’s loyalty.   
Even Congress fell into the same category.  Under the conditions of the new 
threat environment- and the rawness of the recent pain that was so deep, most politicians 
could not afford to seem soft on terrorism and WMD.  The rally-around-the-flag 
mentality built the bandwagon that most had ridden on the path to war.110 
Shared Loci of Responsibility 
Logic and the history of the IC (and other organizations) give few grounds for optimism.  
Because intelligence is unpopular and better intelligence may be even more unpopular, 
political leaders are likely to be content with decrying intelligence’s performance. 
-Robert Jervis111 
 The central theme of this paper is adaptation failure as it concerns the IC.  
However, after reviewing the case of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (and the less in-
                                                            
110 Both this paragraph and the preceding one are an attempt to summarize some of the pertinent arguments 
that Jervis makes on pp. 157- 174.  He also demonstrates how the political composition of the 9/11 
Commission had plagued the resultant judgments, in that they were naturally going to avoid the assertion 
that politics (politicians/politicization) would have been at fault.  Jervis is not alone in his assessment.  One 
of the structural impediments to intelligence sharing was the legislative “wall” that was created in 1995 to 
separate different agencies, as their intermingling could have produced an unconstitutional condition.  The 
reason: FBI is a law enforcement agency that is defined by its investigative capacity to seek evidence for 
the purpose of prosecution in a court of law.   CIA is an agency that pursues secret enemy intentions and 
capabilities in a manner that may contravene U.S. legal code.  The sources, methods, and technology used 
to carry out this function require secrecy and compartmentalization in order to protect foreign assets and 
American strengths and weaknesses from exposure.  Further, CIA does not have authority to carry out its 
mission within the borders of the U.S.   One serious criticism of the 9/11 Commission was that the architect 
of the “wall” was Commissioner Jamie Gorelick, who, as some argue, could not have been expected to 
remain impartial in the investigation process.  See “Gorelick must go”, Paul Rosenzweig, The Washington 
Times, 27 April, 2004, p. A17 and “Rule Created Legal ‘Wall’ To Sharing Information”, Neil A. Lewis, 
The New York Times, 14 April, 2004, Section A; Column 1; National Desk; p. 19. 
111 Why Intelligence Fails, p. 196.  This is not an exclusively American problem.  Following the Yom 
Kippur War, Avi Shlaim had studied the Agranat Commission of Inquiry  (the Israeli commission 
established to review the intelligence failure in 1973).  He contends that “when a nation suffers such 
setbacks as a result of being caught unprepared, a search for scapegoats frequently takes place; the blame is 
often laid at the door of the intelligence community”; “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates:  The 
Case of the Yom Kippur War”, World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April, 1976), 348-380; p. 349.  He had also 
attributed the failure as being derived from theory hugging and the suppression of alternative arguments 
from within the IC; pp. 353, 356-359.   
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depth Iraq WMD mishap), it appears that there is, at minimum, a shared failure between 
policymakers and the IC.  In accordance with academic honesty, there is a conscious 
attempt to remain skeptical about Zegart’s theory.  This paper will not duplicate, nor 
supplant her work in any form; simply building upon it is the objective here.   
Nonetheless, there seem to be some variegated gradations of failure that fall into 
the intelligence-policy realm.   While it is not surprising to see this trend, it is a bit 
disquieting to come to the partial conclusion thus far that the space between the two looks 
more like an abyss; or more pessimistically, a black hole.   If this characterization is 
accurate- and it may not be, it allows for each end of the “intelligence cycle” to dodge 
accountability.  If it is not party A’s fault and it is not party B’s fault, then it could be 
more comfortable for each party to point the culpable finger in the direction of that grey 
area between the two. 
 At the end of the day, however, the intelligence function is a consumer-driven 
pursuit.  The IC exists to produce timely, accurate and relevant information on the issues 
that are most important to consumers.  At a colloquium held at Georgetown on 30 
November, 1994, then Representative Lee Hamilton had counted himself as an 
intelligence consumer for three decades, as he noted: 
There needs to be much broader agreement on the priorities of intelligence, which 
ought to be driven by the foreign policy objectives of the United States.  
Sometimes I think we just collect intelligence for the thrill of collecting it, to show how 
good we are at it.  This is not the fault of the Intelligence Community; it is a fault of the 
policymakers.  We don’t make clear to the Intelligence Community what the priorities 
really are.112   
 
                                                            
112 “The Intelligence Community: Is It Broken?  How To Fix It?”- John H. Hedley, accessed on the CIA’s 
website cia.gov on 29 February, 2004.  Emphasis added. 
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 Such a pronouncement from the policymaking side of the intelligence cycle seems 
to jump out at the reader a bit.  That was in 1994!  Former NSC staffer and CIA Middle 
East specialist Reuel Marc Gerecht has taken a rather cynical view toward the mismatch 
between Washington’s view of their impact on the world and the reality that it appears to 
be in stark contrast with their purported national security priorities: 
I think it’s very, very much true that senior officials in Washington often think they’re 
doing a great deal about a national security issue.  But out in the field, whether it’s with 
the CIA in stations and bases or the FBI in the United States—in actual practice, they’re 
actually not doing very much at all.  I mean, I certainly remember many instances when I 
was overseas with the agency, and I would be seeing commentary either in the press or in 
official statements about what we were doing overseas, and certainly it didn’t match at all 
what the practice was.113  
 In an interesting parallel set of conditions, both the Iraq WMD mishap and the 
Yom Kippur “surprise” attack seem to have each suffered from over-reliance on a single 
source.  In each case, the source received special attention from the highest policymaking 
elements in the respective governments.  Thought to be more accurate than any other 
intelligence that could have been gathered through “conventional” means, both the U.S. 
in 2001 and Israel in 1973 had been sucked into a carefully scripted plot that had ripple 
effects long after the subsequent wars.  In the former, the source was “Curveball”114, 
                                                            
113 As accessed on 23 May, 2004, “Reuel Marc Gerecht and Daniel Benjamin discuss several points of 
Condoleezza Rice’s testimony today before the 9-11 Commission”, National Public Radio (NPR), on the 
program “All Things Considered” (9:00 PM ET) 8 April 2004.   
114 Mentioned in Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, pp. 136-137 and in Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, p. 119.  
“Curveball” was cited 355 times in the The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 
2005, also known as the WMD Commission and as the “Silberman-Robb” Commission.  It can be accessed 
on the F.A.S. (Federation of American Scientists) website: www.fas.org.  “Sometimes a single source can 
make all the difference”, wrote former DCI George Tenet in his autobiography, At the CENTER of the 
STORM: My Years at the CIA, (New York: HarperCollins, 2007); p. 330.   
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whereas in the latter it was “The In-Law” 115, who had duped the Israelis in the lead-up to 
the 1973 war.  In each case the “reliable” source turned out not to be so reliable after all.   
 Even though CIA had judged Curveball to be unreliable, the warning that he was 
a fabricator went unheeded by the policymaking political class.  As can be seen in this 
case, discrepant information was not granted much, if any, attention.  As noted above, 
there are strong human tendencies that resist psychologically discomforting information.  
In the case of the In-Law, his disinformation campaign had been so well crafted that he 
was able to convince the Israelis that there would be an Egyptian attack in October 
(which was true), but gave the Egyptians a 4-hour lead.    
Internal Loci of Responsibility: 
 
This paper may appear to favor the IC over the policymakers.  This is not the 
case.  In order to balance the idea that adaptation failure was a unique product of 
policymaking origin, it is necessary to look at failures from within the IC.  Prima facie, 
this may appear somewhat to be hampering Zegart’s hypothesis that politics were to 
                                                            
115 Whose real identity was Dr. Ashraf Marwan, as cited in The Eve of Destruction: The Untold Story of the 
Yom War, Howard Blum, (New York: HarperCollins, 2003); p. 330.  Blum had also called him “…the most 
effective spy in the history of the Middle East…” in “Who Killed Ashraf Marwan?”, The New York Times, 
13 July, 2007 Op-Ed section.   In a number of articles in the public press, Marwan is depicted as an Israeli 
spy.  However, as Blum notes in his above article, the uppermost echelons of Egyptian government and 
military (including President Hosni Mubarak) attended his funeral.  If Marwan was working for Egypt, he 
appears to have followed the protocols of “surprise attack” studies.  He lulled the Israelis into a trap by 
giving them TOP SECRET Egyptian military documents (known as “chicken feed” in intelligence 
parlance) that were vetted and gauged to be true.  Then he announced in April of that year that the 
Egyptians and Syrians would attack on 5 May, 1973.  Israel had activated its reserves at great cost.  This 
would have served two purposes:  (1) To see how serious the Israelis would take his (dis)information, and 
to assess how far up the policymaking chain it went.  And (2) to “cry wolf” and cause “alert fatigue” (it 
cost Israel $35 million to activate in April), so that the last warning would be dismissed and the necessary 
time to breach the Bar-Lev line (Israel’s fortified Sinai defensive position on the East bank of the Suez 
Canal) would be shortened, hence allowing for deeper penetration into the Sinai.  If Marwan was not 
working for Egypt, one would have expected detailed invasion plans (the Egyptians had burst through the 
high sand walls with hoses).  Either way, it is an interesting case to study if/when some more declassified 
publication by the Egyptians and/or Israelis becomes available. 
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blame.  Nonetheless, looking at both the consumers and producers is useful in that it 
allows flaws to be revealed for what they are.  Metaphorically, to see either a tree or a 
forest and not walk through the forest to observe individual trees is tantamount to 
committing to tunnel vision. 
In the above analysis of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, many of the failures came 
from all directions, but the IC had more than its fair share.  Regarding the 9/11 attacks, 
agencies within the IC, the FBI in particular, were held to the illogical preferences of 
their top leader.  As reported in The New York Times:  
[Former FBI Director] Mr. Freeh was notoriously averse to using computers himself—he 
did not like to use e-mail, for example—and his critics have attacked him as failing to 
commit himself to upgrading the bureau’s system.  The bureau’s computers were so 
inadequate that after the Sept. 11 attacks, the bureau had to send photographs of the 
hijackers by overnight mail because they were unable to e-mail them.116 
 What was equally disturbing was that Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) had 
expressed how this was not news, and it was common knowledge that the FBI had 
suffered from this technological shortcoming for years117.  If it were known to have 
plagued the agency for so long, one would think that Congressional oversight committees 
would have called attention to it and compelled Mr. Freeh to bring his agency up to the 
standard of his counterparts in the IC.  So, while there are deficiencies within the IC’s top 
leadership, there is a historical record of apathy- and a concomitant lack of 
accountability-118 from the Congressional oversight system that monitors the IC, seizes 
                                                            
116 The New York Times, 13 April, 2004, Eric Lichtblau, “Tough Security Questions Are Likely for Ex-
Chief of F.B.I.”, Sec. A; Column 3; National Desk; p. 20. 
117 Ibid.  The 9-11 Commission’s executive director, Philip Zelikow, contends that “the bureau, as it existed 
before September 11th, was unsuited to combating global terrorism”, in “The wrong people doing the right 
job; Reforming the FBI”, The Economist, 17 April, 2004 under the sub-heading, “Rethinking America’s 
spooks.” 
118 “The U.S. Congress and the CIA: Monitoring the Dark Side of Government”, Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Nov., 1980), 477-499, p. 494. 
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on a glaring problem, makes recommendations, and evaluates the progression (or 
stagnation) of adaptability to the changed environment.  
Theoretical Gaps and Semantic Obfuscation 
Theoretical Absence 
Though we have defined “adaptation failure” to be more in concert with Zegart’s 
definition there may be some who feel it isn’t parsimonious enough119.  However, it is in 
keeping with the social science necessity to have a mental framework with which to 
work.  The alternative being that no revolutionary theoretical advancement would 
materialize.  What is most troublesome is that there is a persistent deficiency with studies 
of intelligence: there is no agreed-upon “Theory of Intelligence.”  This is an important 
point, which serious scholars have elucidated on numerous occasions past and present: 
From years of reading and reflection on strategic intelligence, I am convinced that the 
functions of intelligence constitute the largest gap in understanding how foreign policy 
decisions are made.  Discussions of intelligence “failure” abound, but we lack an 
acceptable theory of intelligence that permits systematic evaluations of performance by 
clearly defined criteria.120 
                                                            
119  Rovner and Long have criticized Zegart’s thesis as being too centralized and as ignoring the failure of 
9-11 as owing to policymakers.  They claim that the intelligence community had provided all necessary 
warnings to their political bosses.  “The blame is therefore misplaced: September 11 was a national failure, 
and responsibility must be shouldered in large part by policymakers.  The intelligence community gave 
specific warnings about al-Qaida and proposed a variety of counterterrorist operations before the attacks, 
most of which were ignored or halted by policymakers.”  Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, Amy B. Zegart, 
as they appeared in the Correspondence section, under the title, “How intelligent is Intelligence Reform?” 
in International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 196-208.  The preceding quote is from p. 200.  
Zegart responds (pp. 203-208) in partial agreement with Rovner and Long (even pleading “guilty” to the 
charge of being slanted toward centralization).  However, she infers that their criticisms are deficient, as it 
is not simply a matter of policymakers failing the IC, but an intra-organizational recalcitrance on the part of 
policymakers to implement the more important recommendations that were crafted prior to 9-11.  
Supporting this point, she does note the policymakers as deserving of some blame, but more importantly, 
she is dealing with the question of why the reforms were not able to proceed, even with the heads of CIA 
and FBI in agreement with many of them.     
120 “Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies”, Harry Howe Ransom, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1.  (Mar., 1980), pp. 141-148; quote from p. 147 (Emphasis supplied).  




 The paucity of theoretical propositions regarding intelligence is in large part, 
unfortunately, due to the cultural secrecy and compartmentalization between and within 
the various intelligence agencies121.  The IC itself has been described as a “loose 
confederation”, whose cultural norms preclude the discovery of elements that might assist 
in forming a theory122.  “Thus CIA was (and, we suspect, is yet) a confederacy, in some 
respects similar to the Pentagon.”123  As Daniel Byman makes clear: 
Many of the problems of the CIA, the FBI, the military, and other institutions involved in 
counterterrorism can be laid, at least in part, at the feet of policy makers.  It is the duty of 
elected officials to impose their will on unelected elements of the government, and they 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the subject by scholars.  He also mentions a secondary impact of the secretive nature of intelligence: 
morality is reduced by covert actions that sometimes require ethical misdeeds.  E.g. subversion, inciting 
riots, playing on the weaknesses of others, fomenting discontent and furthering armed revolt, murder, and 
dealing with unsavory people whose human rights violations are well documented.  As the 1970s had 
revealed many embarrassing facts about the IC, commissions convened and their recommendations had 
followed.  Few of them were implemented, but assassination was stricken from practice (Executive Order 
11905) , and the President had to notify approximately six committees of covert action (the Hughes-Ryan 
Act, later replaced by the Intelligence Oversight Act).  Dealing with human rights violators was later 
forbidden in the 1990s (the so-called “Deutch guidelines”, named after the DCI at the time John Deutcsh).  
On the legislative history of the interplay between Congress, the president and the IC see Loch Johnson 
(cited above) “The U.S. Congress and the CIA”; and also by Johnson, “Legislative Reform of Intelligence 
Policy”, Polity, Vol. 17. No. 3 (Spring, 1985), pp. 549-573. 
121 Just trying to understand the filing system, or lack thereof, is a murderous process.  See “Researching 
the Intelligence Agencies: The Problem of Covert Activities”, Athan G. Theoharis, The Public Historian, 
Vol. 6, No.2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 67-76.  Theoharis highlighted numerous “filing” systems in the FBI as 
well as CIA (with a brief discussion of the NSA).  As many such systems were made public during the 
hearings of the 1970s, there was an enormous lot that could never be used by agency historians trying to 
reconstruct and understand the agencies’ past.  Some were destroyed, or locked into a secret file room, or 
slated for destruction at a later defined date (e.g. six months, or 60 weeks, etc.).  Luckily, the “Tolson File” 
came to light, indicating the magnitude of the research problem; pp. 72-74. 
122 Ibid.; see also “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence”, Loch K. Johnson, Comparative 
Strategy, 22: 1-28, 2003; quote from p. 9.  Johnson also echoes the allegation made by many that 
policymakers’ lack of ability or willingness to “… articulate clearly their intelligence priorities” leads to the 
logic that blame for “intelligence failures” should be more correctly assigned to policymakers; the quote is 
from p. 4, whereas the idea regarding blame is drawn from pp. 12 and 25.  Therefore, it is no surprise that 
one of Johnson’s recommendations is that improved communication between the IC and policymakers must 
develop.  William E. Odom takes a similar view, yet divides blame in half and attributes it to both the 
policymakers and the IC: “To pretend that lack of warning of the al Qaeda attacks of 11 September was not 
an intelligence failure is self-deluding.  Yet to see it as an intelligence failure is not to absolve political 
leaders –who are, after all, in charge of the Intelligence Comunnity –of the ultimate responsibility.  This 
disaster is a failure of both intelligence and policy.”  See Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America, 
2nd Ed. William E. Odom, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); p. 187.  
123 Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May 
(New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 218.   
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have the authority to do so.  Policy makers, however, did a poor job imposing their will 
on various bureaucracies that were not aggressive in counterterrorism.124 
Building and improving upon a clear understanding of what an intelligence theory 
would look like is impeded further by the parochial concerns within the IC; e.g., the drive 
to maintain autonomy, insulation, and organizational survival, as it is common practice in 
most organizations.125  Perhaps the reason for the absence of a theory of intelligence has 
to do with the way in which national security agencies are configured in their embryonic 
phase.  According to Zegart, the very creation of the modern IC was a function of inter-
service rivalry and partial compromise that led to it being “flawed by design.”126   
The development of national security agencies being forged out of inter-service 
rivalry, political maneuvering and presidential weakness yields a paradox of sorts: 
national security agencies are supposed to deal with national interests127, but if 
insufficiently designed, they may not fulfill their purported ethos. 
Semantic Haze 
                                                            
124 See Byman, “Strategic Surprise and the September 11 Attacks” (cited earlier), p. 161. 
125 In Fixing Intelligence, Odom states on pp. xiv-xv, “Talk about reform among senior intelligence 
officers, therefore, tends to be either incoherent babble or designed to mislead others in order to protect 
one’s parochial organizational interests.”  Odom’s work highlights the origin and persistent presence of 
bureaucratic turf battles in the IC.    
126 As cited earlier, Zegart: Flawed by Design.  Having read Zegart’s later works, it was useful to study the 
genesis and pathology of her thesis in her prior work.  The case that Zegart makes in this work is that 
politics had played a powerful role in forming the CIA, JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the NSC (National 
Security Council).  Zegart develops a “National Security Model” to explain the evolution of the IC.  This 
model is rooted in new institutionalism, as Zegart makes the case that realism is ill suited for the task of 
analyzing domestic agencies.  Underpinning the assertion made earlier regarding Congressional 
indifference to intelligence affairs, she notes that Congress being composed of elected officials are more 
interested in the matters pertaining to their constituents, and of course, reelection.  The exception occurs 
when there is a big scandal, which captivates the attention of the civilian populace and consequently forces 
Congress to pay attention.  We should note that domestic attention regarding an “intelligence failure” 
spawned by a surprise attack has a reinforcing logic of its own. 
127 Arnold Wolfers, “ ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, 
No. 4 (Dec., 1952), 481-502.  Wolfers suggests that national security interests should reflect core values. 
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The semantic matter revolves around the terms used to describe what needs to 
happen to the IC in order to “fix” it.  It may seem trivial to mention; however, there are 
differences in the concepts “reform”, “evolution”, “revolution” and “transformation”128 
that seem to have implications, which may offer insight into why it is presumed to be 
“broken.”  When the term “broken” is used to characterize the IC, it undoubtedly implies 
that the resolution is to “fix” it.  Similarly, when designating a successful surprise attack 
as a “failure” for the target state, there is a tendency to presuppose that successfully 
thwarting the plot of the attacking party indicates the absence of failure.   
To better illustrate the above discussion, it may be useful to imagine a 
counterfactual scenario.  For example, the 9-11 commission had found eleven 
opportunities that were missed by the IC.   If one of those opportunities was seized upon- 
hence foiling the attack in part, or in whole- would it be fair to say that the IC’s “success” 
negated the remaining ten?  It would not be an accurate judgment for two reasons.  First, 
if the attack was realized in advance, the ten remaining elements that purportedly defined 
the failure would not have been addressed.  Second, the attack may have proceeded, 
perhaps producing less damage, and obviating the need for a commission to find fault in 
the IC.  This topic is not going to be covered here, but simply raising the point may 
stimulate further research.   
Recommending Reorganization as a Political Safety Net 
                                                            
128 “It Is Time to Transform, Not Reform U.S. Intelligence”, Deborah G. Barger, SAIS Review vol. XXIV 
no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004).  Barger notes that the idea of “reform” is backward-looking, whereas 
“transforming” is oriented toward adapting to the changed threat environment in a manner similar to the 
way in which successful corporations either “change, become irrelevant, or cease to exist.” P. 28.   
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 March and Olson have shown that the mere public assertion that there needs to be 
reorganization is all that is required to gain public support.   Even if no change follows, it 
is better politically for both Congress and the President to have made calls for 
reorganization, irrespective of whether such reforms occur129.  In large part this seems to 
explain why so many committees’ recommendations for reorganization and retrofitting 
go unheeded and are not subject to repercussions.  It is a political “dog and pony” show 
approach to address the public (electing constituents’) concerns with government 
response to publicized failures.  This bold assertion is supportive of Zegart’s “enduring 
realities” mentioned earlier130.  As Richard Betts so eloquently brings to light:   
Those informed insiders who propose a revolution in intelligence tend to become 
ambivalent when they consider the risks.  [Deborah] Barger, for example, endorses 
concurrent revolution and evolution, ‘parallel processes’ and ‘competing streams of 
change activity’ that combine bold experimentation and gradualism.  This is theoretically 
possible, just as an emphasis on the high-technology forces and strategies of the 
revolution in military affairs [RMA] should be able to coexist with old-fashioned, low-
tech counterinsurgency in the Defense Department.  But such a combination is very hard 
to manage.  It is difficult to turn a system upside down and tweak it at the same time.131 
Chapter Summary 
 So far, we have looked at some of the links in the chain of failure that have 
usually been associated with the IC.  However, we have gone beyond that prism in an 
                                                            
129 “Organizing Political Life: What Administrative Reorganization Tells Us about Government”, James G. 
March and Johan P. Olson, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 77, No. 2. (June, 1983), pp. 281-
296; see pp. 290-291. 
130 Zegart, Spying Blind; Chapter 4, entitled “Fighting Osama One Bureaucrat at a Time”, pp. 61-100.  This 
chapter looks not only at the executive and legislative disincentives for following through on reform 
recommendations, but on the potent organizational forces operating among and within the affected 
communities: Loyalty to one’s own agency, turf battles, competing for scarce resources between the DOD 
(Department of Defense) and the other members of the community, organizational autonomy and the 
attendant survival and enlarging proclivities to support it, secrecy as a weapon, Congressional power plays, 
risk-averse mentalities as a result of previous public attention to opprobrious acts (CIA and FBI), and the 
constraints of bounded rationality are just a few examples that illustrate the costs of reorganizing.  The 
benefits are difficult to predict, let alone calculate in relation to the heavy costs.  For the most part, it seems 
to deflect negative attention from Congress and the President. 
131 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence; p. 184.   
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effort to understand what the “chain” truly represents.  Therefore, it could be said that 
while intelligence failures are inevitable, there are forces at play beyond the IC’s control 
that may induce or facilitate such failures.  In the next chapter, we will attempt to 
determine whether there have been similar influential relationships in the realm of 
















Chapter 2: Strategic Adaptation and War 
Methods of Analysis 
 To truly apply Zegart’s adaptation failure theory to the military, a much longer 
and more in-depth study would be in order.  As there are inherent limitations on this 
paper’s length, depth, and breadth the objective now is to seek whether or not the 
hypothetical core precepts are indeed as apparent as they are assumed to be.  As this 
paper asserts, there should be elements of a political quality that shade strategic choices 
regarding military action.  To keep in perfect step with Zegart would be impossible, as 
we are dealing with a much larger set of organizations under the Department of Defense 
(DoD).   
Where the “enduring realities” are concerned, it should be recalled that the 
impediments to adaptation are centered on the nature of bureaucratic organizations, 
political actors’ rational self-interest, and national security bureaucrats’ interests.  In the 
case of the military, this task seems a bit less difficult as the element of secrecy plays a 
less important role.  However, what makes it more difficult is the vast amount of publicly 
available material with which to sift and reduce to digestible quality.  Therefore, this 
chapter will take a slightly different approach in terms of style and method. 
  In order to demonstrate the significance of adaptation failure in a military context, 
a few “conventional” conflicts deserve brief attention.  The aim being to identify the 
pitfalls that result from the perpetually repetitive missteps associated with mis-learning 
the lessons of previous conflicts.  Also, it is hoped that the reader begins to develop a 
sense of failure stemming from the tenacious attachment to a failing strategy.  Following 
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this review there will be more focus on the forms of combat that lay outside the 
traditional force-on-force pitched battles that have consumed so much attention in the 
past centuries.  Then, we will briefly identify the context of the counterinsurgency 
literature, which will hopefully provide the reader with an understanding of the stark 
contrast between COIN and traditional views of warfare.  This should set the stage for the 
final discussion regarding the necessary aspects that create learning organizations, which 
are capable of adaptation and the conditions under which politico-military dynamics tend 
to enable (or enfeeble) them. 
Conventional Wars 
The First World War 
Should a new war be fought without regard to the evolution of emerging threats it 
will be at one’s own peril.   This unfortunate phenomenon had occurred in World War 
One (WWI). As European states had approached the emerging possibilities of a Great 
Power War, a “Cult of the Offensive”132 mental framework had materialized.  It became 
more obvious only after the belligerents became bogged down in the trenches on the 
Western Front that a grave miscalculation was made.  The offense-defense balance was 
misunderstood to have been more favorable to the offense when in fact conditions were 
                                                            
132 See “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, Stephen Van Evera, 
International Security, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (Summer, 1984), 58-107.  Also, see the partial refutation on the 
reasoning behind such a mentality in “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Instability”, Scott Sagan, 
International Security, Vol. 11, no. 2, (Fall 1986), pp. 151-175.  Sagan asserts that the requirements of 




quite the opposite133.  Thus, the strategy was supplanted by a defense-dominant 
orientation.  This is in every sense an example of a mismatch between means and ends.   
The Second World War 
It is a common criticism of military leaders that they are always planning to “fight 
the last war”; that is, the previous war that was fought.  As a defense-dominant 
understanding was so painfully learned in WWI, it would soon be succeeded by an 
offense-dominant Blitzkrieg campaign of firepower and maneuver in The Second World 
War134.  This is not an uncommon phenomenon, nor is it limited temporally and spatially 
to early or mid-20th Century Europe (as will be shown later in this paper).135   
When incorrectly gauging one’s threat environment based on outmoded thinking, 
a strategic miscalculation may follow and eventually catastrophe may be the unintended 
consequence.  So, it could be said that a tenacious attachment to one’s sense of comfort in 
assuming that the threat environment remains static may inadvertently negate such 
thinking if one does not reconfigure their approach to suit the possibility that such 
                                                            
133 Conventional wisdom of the 19th Century, as delineated by Clausewitz, had been that defense is 
naturally the stronger form of war.  See On War, Carl Von Clausewitz, (New York: Everyman’s Library, 
Alfred A. Knopf, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 1993 edition), p. 428.  “The 
Somme, 1 July 1916 gives a chilling example of how truly disastrous a human endeavor was the 
requirement to fight a defensive trench warfare campaign, while having the obsolete assumption that war 
could be an offense-dominant venture.”  The Face of Battle, John Keegan, (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 
1985 edition).  Chapter 4, (pp. 207-289).   
134 Clausewitz had not lived to see tanks and planes working in tandem to circumvent the Maginot Line and 
defeat the French in record time in 1940.  Paul Fussell offers an account of the horrors of WWII on the 
Pacific Front in unsettling detail in THANK GOD FOR THE ATOM BOMB AND OTHER ESSAYS, (New 
York: Summit Books, 1988);pp. 13-37.  Also by Fussell, see Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the 
Second World War, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Chapter 18: “The Real War Will 
Never Get in the Books” [a quote associated with Walt Whitman, located on p. 290]. 
135 David Kilcullen draws on the analogy of these “chateau generals” of 1914 to illustrate contemporary 
misguided thinking in The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009); p. 287. 
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accepted wisdom is no longer applicable136.  This conceptual rigidity is particularly 
hazardous if the signs of environmental change are observable, but dismissed out of hand. 
The 1991 Persian Gulf War 
 After Iraq’s Army had crossed its southern border, successfully invaded, and 
occupied Kuwait in August of 1990, the combined coalition forces (under the auspices of 
the UN) had reversed the aggression and returned the region to the status quo ante 
bellum.137  The heavy application of conventional firepower and maneuver, combined 
with the initial (and continuous) application of air power and an overall American 
technological supremacy had proved efficacious.  The 1991 Persian Gulf War was 
perhaps the last known successful conventional endeavor in modern warfare.   
The Space between Conventional and Unconventional Wars 
The reader may notice that the Vietnam and Korean Wars were not addressed 
here.  They will be taken up shortly, as they did not fit neatly into the conventional war 
typology.  In the early 1980s a new strategy began to dominate the American DoD: Air 
Land Battle.138  This doctrine held that the Army would need a variety of mostly heavy 
land forces coupled with CAS (Close Air Support) from the Air Force to win any 
conventional wars to come.  It was based on the Cold War idea that if an East-West 
nuclear war had not erupted, a conventional war might.  Hence, preparedness for that 
                                                            
136 “Military strategists tend to mislearn, in cyclical fashion, the lessons of war concerning the relative 
dominance of offensive and defensive capabilities.”  See earlier citation regarding Betts, “Surprises Despite 
Warning”; p. 569. 
137 The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, Lawrence Freedman and 
Efraim Karsh, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
138 The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Adrian R. Lewis (New York: Routledge, 2007); pp. 301-304.  This work will be referenced a 
number of times.  
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possible mode of combat needed consideration.  This was largely an effort to match the 
echelon-based Soviet doctrine of the time as it related to the projected European theater.  
 The Air Force, however, had viewed CAS as less than prestigious.  They 
preferred the WWII long-range strategic bombing approach139.  The growing pains of the 
Air Land Battle paradigm were painfully evident in Grenada during Operation Urgent 
Fury.140  The operations in Grenada, Panama and Haiti are considered to exist somewhere 
between the realm of conventional and unconventional forms of warfare.  As far as the 
intensity spectrum of conflict is concerned, they were low.141 
Unconventional Wars and Asymmetry 
 Usage of the terms “conventional war” should be interpreted as conflict that is 
non-nuclear and descriptive of the forms of warfare that have been commonplace 
between and amongst the Great Powers throughout centuries past.  There are, of course, 
developments in technology and war-craft that have altered the means employed in 
conducting combat142, but the concept survives.  “Unconventional war” in this paper 
refers to that which lies outside of the realm of the aforementioned.  This may lead to 
“asymmetric warfare”; that is, a concept describing the correlation of forces as it relates 
                                                            
139 Ibid. p. 303. 
140 See Zegart, Flawed by Design, pp. 144-145, 230-231.  The costly invasion of Grenada had been an 
outgrowth of budgetary inter-service wars, the attendant parochialism, and poor inter-service 
communication.  See the specific inter-service communication errors and the resultant deaths in “Grenada, 
Panama and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform”, Ronald H. Cole, Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 
1998-99; pp. 57-64.   
141 James Berry Motley discusses some of the friendly fire costs of the operation in Grenada and the 
operation’s importance as a harbinger of low-intensity conflicts to come in “Grenada: Low-Intensity 
Conflict and the Use of U.S. Military Power”, World Affairs, Vol. 146, No. 3 (Winter) 1983-84, pp. 221-
238. 
142 For example, the use of rigid formations of infantry and archers, chariots and crossbows, light cavalry 
and heavy cavalry have mostly been supplanted by rapid-fire repeating machineguns, artillery barrages, 
tanks, planes, mechanized forces, precision guided munitions, cryptologically secure communications, etc.  




to a mismatch in capabilities between adversaries.  This condition may lead one or more 
inferior belligerents to attempt to offset the conventional power disparity by means that 
seek to circumvent enemy strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses.143     
Korea, Conventional, or Unconventional? 
 The Korean War was in many ways a conventional campaign.  There were tanks, 
planes, infantry and artillery.  However, both the North Koreans and the Chinese had 
opted for a form of combat that was very much a part of recent Far Eastern history: 
guerilla warfare144.  North Korea had at the ready “a large, well-equipped, well-trained 
guerilla force that had infiltrated into South Korea to instigate an insurgency.”145  What is 
relevant to this paper is that the NKPA (North Korean People’s Army) had both a 
conventional and unconventional array of forces at their disposal.  The United States did 
not. 
 From early on (26 October, 1950), the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
had ordered the People’s Volunteer Army (Chinese People’s Volunteers- CPV) to 
surreptitiously cross the border with North Korea and engage the U.S. Army in a hit-and-
run assault, or guerilla-style warfare.  The sole purpose for this belligerent act was to give 
credibility to the previous warnings that encroaching on the Chinese sphere of influence 
by crossing the 38th parallel would meet resistance.  On 24 November 1950, it became 
                                                            
143 In a National Public Radio interview, LTC John Nagl had made the following point that, “Until we 
demonstrate that we’re just as good at counterinsurgency as we are at conventional warfare, our enemies 
are going to go where we’re comparatively weak.” “Beating Insurgents Takes Unconventional War”, 
National Public Radio, 12 February, 2008 (“All Things Considered”). 
144 A definition for the term “guerilla warfare” is in order.  The U.S. DoD defines it as “Military and 
paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular , predominantly 
indigenous forces”; Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, 8 November 2010 (As Amended through 31 December 2010). 
145 Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War; p. 89.  Much of the remaining discussion of the Korean 
War derives from pp. 83-145. 
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apparent that the PRC’s (People’s Republic of China) warning went unheeded.  As a 
result, the CPV became fully engaged and committed to turning back the virtually 
unencumbered progress.  The CPV followed the American Eighth Army’s advance with a 
very forceful counter-attack and pushed the Americans south into a defensive 
retrograde146.   
 There was no denying that the CPV had chosen to use infiltration and night 
operations, enveloping the American-led UN forces and causing their rearguard and 
vanguard elements to fight for their southern retreat.  It took a month or so, but General 
Ridgway had identified some of the American Eighth Army’s weaknesses.  This included 
low morale, a tendency to remain road-bound, thinking in terms of a conventional WWII 
force-on-force approach, and a bunker mentality.    
The American Experience with Irregular Warfare in Korea 
 Ridgway had made the appropriate requests to support his soldiers, boosting their 
morale and fighting strength.  He had also ordered his soldiers to constantly engage the 
enemy where they operated most effectively: the mountains.  He had ordered all patrols, 
including night patrols to be increased.  Ridgway had also not only ordered all units to 
travel in open jeeps, but had himself demonstrated this tactic.  As a “… function of 
cultural learning…”147 he had realized that the American soldier had to “…adapt to new 
conditions and a new enemy.”148  In order to recover lost ground and lost spirit, General 
Matthew B. Ridgway had to break with tradition and adjust to the changed threat 
environment.     
                                                            
146 Ibid.; pp. 105-106. 
147 Ibid.; p. 110. 
148 Ibid.; p. 112. 
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Who Was Victorious and Why? 
 There probably is no definitive answer to the question of victory.  What seems to 
stand out is the marked difference from the prior decade’s war practice.  This war was 
limited, a foreign concept to most U.S. citizens.  Taking up the cause of an isthmus on the 
other side of the world, for a people that are culturally alien could not produce the same 
level of domestic support in the United States that would have characterized the 
potentially existential threat facing America’s allies in WWII.  One main objective of the 
UN forces was to return the NKPA back to their side of the 38th parallel.  Another was to 
destroy the NKPA.  Both were accomplished. 
 On the other hand, fighting a limited war requires limited objectives, as opposed 
to a total war’s aim: absolute victory.  Fighting to a stalemate with the CPV and losing 
initiative (and lives), while negotiating under static attrition warfare is hardly a decisive 
victory.  What is more, the service cultures had stymied the appropriate application of 
force to meet the threat.149  The newly created Air Force (formerly the Army Air Force) 
was enamored of its decisive role in WWII, a result of strategic bombing.  As Adrian 
Lewis assesses: 
The Air Force entered the Korean War unprepared to fight the type of war required of it 
by political leaders.  The Tactical Air Command (TAC) was too low on the Air Force’s 
list of priorities to adequately prepare for a limited war; in fact, by January 1949 the TAC 
had been demoted to a planning headquarters stripped of its units and absorbed into the 
Continental Air Command.  Army protests and the arguments within the Air Force, 
caused the restoration of the TAC in July of 1950.  Nevertheless, the Strategic Air 
Command had been the primary focus of the Air Force, receiving the majority of 
resources – energy, intellect, budget, talent, and prestige.  By experience, training, 
doctrine, technology, and culture the Air Force was geared and oriented toward strategic 
bombing and more total war.  In limited wars, the Air Force could not fight the way it 
                                                            
149 Ibid.; p. 115. 
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was designed or had planned.  The Air Force, thus, had to adapt its strategic bombers and 
other technologies to conduct tactical missions.150 
 Though the Air Force did not see fit to employ strategic bombers in support of 
ground operations, the Navy did.  However, the Air Force made its best efforts to prevent 
the Navy from doing so151.  This was another example, among many like it, where inter-
service rivalry had produced very little benefit and a reinforced organizational rigidity.   
Lessons Learned 
 It appears that the American forces in Korea learned very few lessons.  
Even when U.S./UN air dominance was established (through the use of Navy Aircraft 
Carriers), the CPV and NKPA employed the tactics of guerilla warfare to undermine its 
effects.  “Americans, however, would not learn this lesson.  For America this conclusion 
only meant that better technology was needed.”152  Unfortunately, this still seems to have 
been true in Vietnam (and today as well).  In Korea, the U.S. Army had to adapt during 
war to meet the NKPA and CPV tactics (although too late to produce definitive results; a 
stalemate that relied on defensive attrition could hardly be viewed as a victory).   
Vietnam, Conventional, or Unconventional? 
 The Vietnam War was both conventional and unconventional.  The North 
Vietnamese Army and its Viet Cong cohorts were using subversion and unconventional 
means of attack, supply, and movement.  The American Army was stuck on the 
conventional tactics and operations that reflected the strategy of meeting a modern 
military.  As patently obvious as it became, tanks could not operate in tunnels and forests, 
                                                            
150 Ibid.; p. 117. 
151 Ibid.; pp. 119-120. 
152 Ibid.; p. 122. 
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planes and helicopters could not see through thick jungle canopies, and soldiers focused 
on finding and killing the enemy- while sacrificing the needs of the civilian populace- 
could never properly defeat a guerilla insurgency.153   
 The North Vietnamese had adopted a guerilla strategy until the period 1968-1972, 
in which they had switched to a conventional approach154.  The Americans had relied on 
a conventional strategy that was predisposed to believe in the usefulness of air power as a 
coercive implement of war.  Due to the mismatch in strategy, the Americans could not 
have achieved victory, as it would have required “… exploiting the vulnerabilities in the 
opponent’s strategy”155.  Robert A. Pape has analyzed the efficacy of airpower and 
coercion and concluded that the only relatively successful American bombing campaigns 
were Linebacker I and Linebacker II in 1972.  He asserts that this success was a direct 
result of the choice by North Vietnam to adopt a conventional war strategy, which in 
effect had to rely on conventional support mechanisms that were vulnerable to 
interdiction.   
Conventional LOCs (Lines of Communication- such as roadways, railways, 
airports, waterways, communication networks, etc.) serve conventional mechanized 
forces.   On the contrary, guerilla LOCs are not as significant to the maintenance of the 
fighting units, and in fact run in the reverse order (from front to rear, whereas 
                                                            
153 Kalev I. Sepp goes into some detail regarding the application of a successful COIN strategy in Kalev I. 
Sepp, Ph.D., “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency”, Military Review, May-June, 2005, pp. 8-12.  On p. 11, 
in reference to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the American experience in the 
1960s-70s, he draws the parallel that, “…Americans and Soviets employed massive artillery and aerial 
firepower with the intent to defeat enemy forces by attriting them to a point of collapse, an objective which 
was never reached.”  
154 Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Robert A. Pape, (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1996).  Specifically, Chapter 6: Vietnam 1965-1972, pp. 174-210.  Even more 
specifically, pp. 176, 191, 195, 200, 209.  Elsewhere in the book, pp. 75-76. 
155 Ibid.; p. 175. 
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conventional LOCs run from rear to front)156.  Guerillas operate in smaller units and 
require little support from the rear.  Their food supply is secured as they manipulate the 
population and thus the center of gravity157.  Pape found the main cause of failure to have 
been American civilian and military leaders’ deficient thinking as it related to 
“…American military action and the enemy’s goals”.158 
The American Experience with Irregular Warfare in Vietnam 
 The American Army in Vietnam did not adapt to meet the changed threat 
environment in Southeast Asia.  It was not for a lack of knowledge that the enemy’s 
preferred approach to combat was unconventional.  In fact, Mao Tse-Tung had managed 
to effectively employ guerilla warfare to secure and hold power in China (and wrote a 
manual/book about it).  What is more, unconventional guerilla approaches to war have 
been successfully employed in Europe, North Africa, Asia, Cuba, etc.159  In referring to 
guerilla warfare as “camouflaged war”, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart stated: 
It is not too late to learn from the experience of history.  However tempting the idea may 
seem of replying to our opponents’ ‘camouflaged war’ activities by counter-offensive 
moves of the same kind, it would be wiser to devise and pursue a more subtle and far-
seeing counter-strategy.  In any case, those who frame policy and apply it need a better 
understanding of the subject than has been shown in the past.160 
In Vietnam there were glimmers of success, however.  Primarily, these could be 
seen in the Special Forces, CAPs (Combined Action Program), and CIDG (Civilian 
                                                            
156 Ibid.; p. 191. 
157 Ibid.; “… guerilla warfare required little in the way of supplies and next to nothing at all from North 
Vietnam”; p. 192.  Also, pp. 30-31. 
158 Ibid.; p. 210, emphasis in the original.  He concludes on the same page, “Consequently, American 
leaders failed to realize that no coercive air power strategy could have succeeded during 1965-1968.  The 
cheap, quick solution they so badly wanted did not exist”. 
159 B.H. Liddell Hart had referenced the term “guerilla” to have been popularized in Spain against the 
conventional army of Napoleon.  He also speaks of allied subversion against the Nazis in Europe in WWII 
and the growth of guerilla strategies of warfare during the Cold War.  See Strategy, B.H. Liddell Hart (New 
York: Meridian, second revised ed. 1991).  See Chapter XXIII: Guerilla War; pp. 361-370. 
160 Ibid.; p. 370. 
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Irregular Defense Group) programs.161  It was not as though policymakers were unaware 
of the changed threat environment; they were just so fixated on mechanized engagements 
in the European theater of war as the alternative to global nuclear war.162 
Who Was Victorious and Why? 
You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will 
lose and I will win. 
     -Ho Chi Minh163 
 The U.S. Army was beholden to its “Army Concept” of war, which had envisaged 
a mid-intensity, or high intensity conventional campaign, geared toward the use of 
technology to carry out its objectives164.  Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. has offered that: 
While throughout its Vietnam experience the Army encountered a number of signs 
indicating that a change in its Concept was required in order to combat the insurgency 
more effectively, the Army leadership persisted in approaching the war within the 
framework of the Concept.165 
As a result of such biases, resource allocation166 and personnel promotion 
incentives167 reflected the Army’s cultural aversion to paramilitary and civilian-led 
                                                            
161 The Kennedy Administration had placed an emphasis on paramilitary operations, but “the Army culture 
proved incapable of adapting to this form of warfare…” Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War pp. 
226-227.  Lewis cites the period 1961-1963 as the most successful matching the strategy of the North 
Vietnamese.  He also notes that the downward spiral in effectiveness was marked by the absorption of these 
forces into the MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) and its subsequent subordination to 
conventional war support. 
162 Ibid.; pp. 220-222.  On p. 221 he cites Bernard Fall’s calculation that the war in Vietnam was the forty-
eighth small war of the Twentieth Century.  The term “small war” is synonymous with “guerilla” (as it is 
derived from Spanish). 
163 Ho Chi Minh’s warning to the French in 1946, as cited by Stanley Karnow, Time, 13 April 1998, Vol. 
151, Issue 14, p. 157. 
164 The Army and Vietnam, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986; 1988 paperback ed.), pp. 4-7. 
165 Ibid.; pp. 6-7.   
166 Ibid.; p. 215. 
167 Ibid.; p. 220. 
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efforts at counterinsurgency (e.g. CORDS- Civil Operations and Revolutionary 
Development Support)168.   
Lessons Learned 
 Krepinevich contends that “if the Army has learned any lessons from Vietnam, it 
has learned many of the wrong ones”169.  It isn’t only the Army leadership’s view that is 
to blame; it also had to operate in an inauspicious political climate.  “In sum, it seems that 
the military is more concerned about the intestinal fortitude of the executive and 
congressional leadership and the will of the American people than it is about the tough 
questions of its own doctrine and force structure”170. 
 Krepinevich concludes his 1986 study with what would prove to be very prescient 
thoughts: 
Low-intensity warfare [the realm of guerilla insurgencies] represents the most likely 
arena of future conflict for the Army, and counterinsurgency the most demanding 
contingency.171 
The paradox that obtains from this prophecy is best stated as follows: 
For in spite of its anguish in Vietnam, the Army has learned little of value.  Yet the 
nation’s policymakers have endorsed the service’s misperceptions derived from the war 
while contemplating an increased U.S. role in Third World low-intensity conflicts.  This 
represents a very dangerous mixture that in the end may see the Army again attempting to 
fight a conventional war against a very unconventional enemy.172 
                                                            
168 Ibid.; p. 221: “Unfortunately, paramilitary forces did not fit the Army’s perception of the war and its 
propensity for seeking solutions through conventional means”.  Also, see pp. 232-233. 
169 Ibid.; p. 269. 
170 Ibid.; p. 270.  On pp. 270-271 Krepinevich explains the outcome of such conventional leanings, “Thus, 
in Vietnam the Army ended up trying to fight the kind of conventional war that it was trained, organized, 
and prepared (and that it wanted) to fight instead of the counterinsurgency war it was sent to fight” 
[emphasis in original].  After the war, the Army’s disdain for anything outside the mainstream conventional 
view remained constant and was even geared toward discouraging the study of counterinsurgency.  Again, 
Krepinevich notes, “Indeed, once the Army completed its pullout from South Vietnam, the service sought 
to expunge the memory of the counterinsurgency experience from its officer corps”.  Also, see p. 275. 
171 Ibid.; p. 274. 
172 Ibid.; p. 275.  How correct he unfortunately was. 
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Evolving Generations of Warfare  
 Colonel (COL) Thomas X. Hammes makes the case that warfare is not 
revolutionary, but evolutionary173.  He highlights the First Generation Warfare (1GW)174 
as being line and column face-to-face attrition battles, whereas the 2GW had consisted of 
massed firepower.  The 3GW was focused on maneuver, and 4GW being the current 
iteration of warfare as embodied in the low-intensity, unconventional application of force 
as a means to achieving political objectives.  Hammes argues that the precursors for such 
an evolution were demonstrable for the last seventy years, with each successive 4GW 
engagement evolving and improving.   
 T.X. Hammes claims that evolutions in warfare seem to coincide with political, 
economic, social and technical changes.  In short: as society evolves, so does warfare.  
He illustrates how 4GW has continued to evolve from the initial failings and eventual 
successes of Mao Tse Tung’s (also written Mao Zedong) People’s War in the 1920s, 30s, 
and 40s.  Mao had to experience tremendous loss (as exemplified in the “long march” 
westward) and learn from it.  
 In Vietnam the Communists under Ho Chi Minh had successfully implemented 
Mao’s strategy against the French in the 1950s and eventually achieved victory over the 
U.S. in the decades that had followed.  “Changing the correlation of forces” was the 
outcome of a campaign focused on the U.S. center of gravity: political will, as a 
manipulation of the democratic system through public relations and an intolerable body 
count. 
                                                            
173 The Sling and the Stone: on War in the 21st Century, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, (St. Paul, 
MN: Zenith Press, 2006). 
174 2GW being shorthand for Second Generation Warfare, and so on. 
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 In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas were all but defeated in the early 1960s.  Eventually 
they had learned from their previous mistakes and began to use public relations, 
diplomacy and a deceptive democratic appearance, in order to internally and externally 
balance their power.  After nearly twenty years, success was achieved. 
 COL Hammes has indicated how the grassroots successes of the Palestinian 
Intifada (Intifada I) in the 1980s-1990s were later reversed in the Second Intifada 
(Intifada II, aka- the al Aqsa Intifada, 2001- ?).  The key refinement in Intifada I was the 
extent to which the message had reached the world that the Palestinians wanted the 
Israelis out.  This message was lost in Intifada II when it turned into being about the 
annihilation of Israel.  This was further exacerbated by Arafat and his PLO, who were not 
key components of Intifada I and its subsequent evolution. 
 He also argues that the way the U.S. failed to grasp the 4GW nature of Vietnam is 
the same problem the Israelis had in Intifada I.  The Israelis, however, were able to learn 
(one might even conclude that they had adapted) by the al Aqsa Intifada and began to 
counter the Palestinians through the same medium.  Hammes asserts that the U.S. has 
been stuck on 3GW since WWII, and seems to plan for the current wars the same as it 
does the future wars.  The theme of Hammes’s book is very clear: The U.S. should have 
recognized the symptoms of a change in the nature of warfare, but failed to adapt to 
reflect a matching strategy in kind.  Instead, the U.S. DOD has been battle-focused, as 
opposed to war-focused and has sought technological solutions over human-centric ones.  
The most glaring cause for such an adaptation failure seems to be rooted in the nature of 
bureaucracies and their consequent inflexibility.   
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 This leads to another point, which is that the assumption that 4GW as the final 
expression of strategy would be foolish and shortsighted.  “We have to assume fifth-
generation warfare is out there”.175  In fact, one can already see some evolution toward 
that end.  China has been focused not only on conventional aspects of military strategy, 
but also on the ability to not even engage in armed conflict, hence applying a strategy in 
technical terms176.   
Three examples illustrate an emerging 5GW: the Chinese attempt to knock out a 
satellite in space and the recent compromise of global internet security, which had 
reportedly penetrated the U.S. DoD’s system177.  The purported Israeli “Stuxnet” cyber-
attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is another example of evolution in war-fighting178.  Both 
China and Israel seem to be gravitating toward a high-tech means of achieving some form 
of victory without firing a shot.  This does not mean that either state has sought to 
eliminate their conventional military means.  One final realm has surfaced lately, which 
could be viewed, perhaps, as useable under conditions of asymmetry: the “Wikileaks” 




175 Ibid.; p. 274. 
176 See “Power in Cyberspace”, Nigel Inkster, International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS Global 
Perspectives forum, from a speech given on 18 January, 2011 in Bahrain.  Both the U.S. and China seem to 
be incorporating “Cyber Warfare” into their lexicon.  In the case of the former, a US Cyber Command was 
recently established.  In the latter, the doctrine of Integrated Network Electronic Warfare has been adopted. 
177 See “Worldview: The United States needs defense against cyberattacks”, Trudy Rubin, The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 12 December, 2010.  The article highlights a speech given by former White House 
“counterterrorism czar”, Richard A. Clarke, to Philadelphia’s Foreign Policy Institute. 
178 See “Stuxnet virus sets back Iran’s nuclear program by 2 years”, The Jerusalem Post, Yaakov Katz, 15 
December, 2010. 
179 See, “Cyberwarriors Wanted”, Daily News (Sports Final Edition), editorial p. 22, 13 December, 2010. 
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The U.S. and Iraq (2003- ?) 
 The United States military entered Iraq on 21 March 2003, in a conventional 
combat operation.  The primary military objective at hand was of a common, 
conventional nature: to destroy the Iraqi military forces and topple the regime of Saddam 
Hussein (the latter objective is admittedly less common than the former).  Bearing many 
resemblances to the previous war of 1991, the United States military (and coalition 
forces) prevailed with swiftness.  A secondary objective, which would necessarily require 
a longer stay, was driven by ideology: to liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny and plant 
the seeds of democracy180.   
What followed shortly after the initial invasion was anything but conventional.  
Asymmetric operations had erupted the very next day181.  As Iraqi military units began to 
disappear and dissolve into the civilian population, the U. S. military found itself 
increasingly facing an unanticipated irregular threat: guerilla war.  Until the end of 2006 
the U.S. political leadership and most of the military hierarchy had been tenaciously 
recalcitrant and dedicated to a mismatched conventional strategy.  There were, however, 
                                                            
180 The plan to invade Iraq and cause a regime change was certainly a central objective, along with the 
search for and destruction of WMDs.  See the National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book #326, 
which may be accessed at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB326/index.htm.  The Grand 
Strategy behind the Bush Doctrine was transforming the Middle East, see “A Grand Strategy of 
Transformation”, John Lewis Gaddis, Foreign Policy, No. 133 (Nov.- Dec., 2002), pp. 50-57. 
181 On 22 March, 2003 a guerilla-oriented attack had occurred, whereby the armed subjects attacking the 
U.S. forces wore no uniforms and appeared to be civilians.  See Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American 
Military Adventure in Iraq (2nd Edition, Penguin: 2007), p. 118.  It was apparently inconceivable that the 
war in Iraq would transform so rapidly into an insurgency campaign.  Yet, in the middle of conventional 
combat operations, the Iraqi military was changing out of their uniforms and engaging U.S. forces in 
civilian garb; see Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy, Steven Metz (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 
Books, Inc., 2008), pp. 141-143. 
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dissidents within the military (active and retired) and academia, whose voices were 
suppressed until the obvious became intolerable182.     
What is interesting for this paper is not that the American administration and 
military leaders were so spellbound by their conventional “wisdom”, but that they 
remained so in spite of overwhelming evidence that the policy was impotent and the 
strategic objectives were far-fetched.  In ways similar to the above discussion of the 
pitfalls of intelligence adaptation failure, there seems to be a constant principle at play.  
Namely, that until a past failure is perceived, cultural and cognitive rigidity will inhibit 
future adaptation.  Perhaps it could be said that one way to overcome this handicap 
requires that an appreciation of its presence is invoked by a sense of humility, and 
sustained by learning the correct lessons.  This principle does not alone account for 
adaptation failure (or success), but may serve to describe the conditions under which 
policy and strategy re-align with reality.  That being said, there are other matters with 
which to contend, that speak more to the core of this paper’s focus.   
As was discussed in chapter two, the IC is a tool for serving policy needs.  As for 
the role of force, Clausewitz had long ago instructed that, “war is not merely an act of 
policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on 
with other means”183.  However, if policymakers are beholden to a faulty policy, then the 
application of military means toward those ends are bound to produce failure.  In other 
words, if military leaders are pursuing a military strategy that complements an unrealistic 
set of policy aims, it is doubly damaging.  Therefore, the policy and/or the strategy for 
                                                            
182 This point is underscored numerous times, and indeed forms a main theme for The Gamble: General 
David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008, Thomas E. Ricks, (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2009). 
183 On War, p. 99. 
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achieving it (the application of force in the case of Iraq) must adjust to bring means and 
ends into harmony.  In 2003- 2006 Iraq, it appears that this point was nearly lost, whereas 
in 2006- 2007 it was discovered.  What it took to adapt and steer away from complete 
failure follows. 
Elements of Military Adaptation Failure (and Success) 
The question remains: why the adaptation failure from 2003- 2006?  Further, what 
mechanisms allowed for adaptation success in the period 2006- 2007.  Here we can delve 
into the realm of the military set of organizations that operate in a competitive 
environment, but not at the risk of discounting the political decisions, which caused the 
military to become engaged.  The military organizational learning process will be 
explored first, particularly that of the army.  One possible misinterpretation must briefly 
be addressed.  The author is not suggesting that when one form of warfare is dominant, it 
will always be so.  Rather, if an adversary’s use of a potent form of warfare has achieved 
certain political objectives, or is successful in blunting the objectives of another, it should 
be recognized as a force (not the force) to be countered in future engagements.   
As previously mentioned, the initial invasion of Iraq had appeared to be 
successful.  As the Iraqi military had realized that it could not parry the coalition advance 
through conventional means, a different set of tactics had to be chosen, embodied in 
guerilla warfare.  Guerilla warfare is not merely a regimen of routine tactics, but a 
strategy for addressing and counterbalancing the inequitable distribution of force 
mechanisms (men/women, materiel, technology, etc.).   
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Concerns regarding budget cuts and the attendant perceived diminution in 
importance for the organization are primal fears.184  Military organizations are naturally 
defeat-averse and would only seek to avoid changes viewed as detrimental to the overall 
health of the organization.  Further, James J. Wirtz states that “it is unlikely that 
organizations will develop measures of effectiveness that call into question the version of 
their own identity to which they are obsessively attached.”185 
Wirtz offers some insight into the history of the U.S. counterinsurgency school of 
thought. “A ‘never again’ school emerged, especially within the U.S. Army, which 
identified counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts as detrimental to the interests of 
the United States in general and the U.S. military in particular.” 186   This emphasizes the 
issue of “culture” in military thinking.  He argues that in applying the principles of 
Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR), security should receive a 
relatively superior weight.  Wirtz also suggests that a chief underlying impediment to 
implementation of SSTR is found in the bureaucratic nature of military organizations, as 
“they are deeply influenced by their operational/strategic ‘essence’- an agreed-upon body 
of concepts that informs members about organizational culture and missions.”187   
                                                            
184 This phenomenon is not limited to the realm of the military.  In Fixing Intelligence (cited earlier),Odom 
states (on pp. 10-11), “The arcane and insular character of most intelligence activities also contributed to a 
lack of understanding of the problems confronting the Intelligence Community.  Senior officials most often 
spend careers in a single agency, and therefore they arrive at senior posts largely ignorant of other parts of 
the Intelligence Community.  Without a doctrine for intelligence operations and management, they have 
behaved as any organization theorist would predict: they have defended the parochial resource interests of 
their home agencies.” 
185 Ibid. 281. 
186 James J. Wirtz, Chapter 8 “The Exquisite Problem of Victory: Measuring Success in Unconventional 
Operations”, Part III: Learning, Innovation, and New Initiatives.  This is pulled from a study by the 
Strategic Studies Institute, entitled, “Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction Roles”, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, December 2007, 
605 pages.  Chapter 8 consists of pp. 267-284.   
187 Ibid., 278-279. 
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The first three years of the American occupation of Iraq could be said to have 
been a complete disaster.  More than anything else, two causal factors seemed to have 
been ever-present: the interests of national security bureaucrats and the nature of 
bureaucratic organizations (from Zegart’s points regarding adaptation failure).  As for 
the first point, there is evidence that political affiliations had been a potent force driving 
decisions from the top-down.  This theme is a constant in Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s 
Imperial Life in the Emerald City188.   
The possibility that an insurgency would erupt following conventional combat 
operations was not unanticipated.  While willfully ignoring the State Department’s 
“Future of Iraq Project” (which addressed the possibility for a prolonged occupation and 
reconstruction effort), the Bush administration had applied downward pressure to see to it 
that the report would not receive serious consideration.189   
As for the nature of bureaucratic organizations, it is instructive to recall the level 
of resistance that was- and had remained- culturally embedded in the military, 
particularly the U.S. Army during and after Vietnam. The “American army was not a 
                                                            
188 Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2006), pp. 286-288.  Political affiliation and favoritism were very palpable in terms of 
choosing who was going to run the occupation efforts and what policies were to be instituted.  On the 
unrealistic aims see p. 321.  Also, much of the essence of Ricks’s Fiasco (cited earlier) had described the 
tenacious attachment that the Washington policymakers held in regard to both the conduct of the war 
(operations) and the overall objectives of the war (strategy).   
189 See “Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq”, Benjamin H. Friedman, Harvey M. Sapolsky, and 
Christopher Preble in The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, 7th edition, eds. Robert 
J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009).  Specifically, 
pp. 300- 301. 
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learning institution during its involvement in Vietnam but was in fact organizationally 
disposed against learning how to fight and win counterinsurgency warfare.”190   
Failing to appreciate guerilla insurgency as a strategy, is to render oneself 
ineffective in countering it, as “conventional operations by themselves have at best no 
more effect than a fly swatter.”191  There are many features that make conventional forces 
vulnerable to unconventional tactics and strategy.  Robert Taber (the only American 
fighting alongside Fidel Castro in the defense of Playa Giron) has highlighted many of 
the weaknesses of the conventional military when they are engaged with a guerilla 
enemy192.  They cannot all be addressed here; however, awareness of the existence of just 
a few of them shows how much adaptation would be required in order to meet an 
insurgency on equal terms.   
• “the guerilla has the initiative; it is he who begins the war, and he who 
decides when and where to strike”193 
• “The military has extensive holdings to protect”194 
                                                            
190 Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, John A. 
Nagl, PhD., LTC U.S. Army (ret.), (University of Chicago Press: 2005 edition), p. 11.  Nagl repeats this 
theme several times in his work: “The organizational culture of the United States Army precluded 
organizational learning on counterinsurgency during the Vietnam War.”- p. 180.  Also pp. 198- 199.  For a 
look at the organizational recalcitrance after the Vietnam War see pp. 204-208. 
191 Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, David Galula, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, 
reprinted 2006), p. 51.  Galula’s book is regarded by many as being central to understanding of both 
guerilla insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.  On the “limits of conventional warfare” putting aside the 
political and economic factors and focusing on the military he says, “It is not a problem of means since the 
counterinsurgent forces are still largely superior to the insurgent’s, even though they may be dispersed.  It 
is primarily a problem of strategy and tactics, of methods and organization.”- p. 50. 
192 War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerilla Warfare, Robert Taber, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2002).  The title of the book is derived from the following oversimplified, yet appropriate analogy, 
“the guerilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s disadvantages: too much to 
defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with.  If the war continues long enough- 
this is the theory- the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on 
which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws”; p. 20. 
193 Ibid.; p. 10.  It is important to bear in mind that that the application of this maxim references the 




• “The guerilla has the freedom of his poverty”195 
• Democracies are especially vulnerable as they “must maintain the 
appearance of normalcy; they can be embarrassed out of office.  And they 
are triply vulnerable because they cannot be as ruthless as the situation 
demands.  They cannot openly crush the opposition that embarrasses and 
harasses them.  They must be wooers as well as doers”196 
The few (yet incomplete) points mentioned above are merely meant to show how 
a conventional modern army is faced with an enemy that is able to manipulate all 
elements of the political and military environment at a low cost and to good effect.  In 
order to close the gaps with the guerilla forces, the persistent protection of the population 
is the only corresponding approach; for acting like a guerilla will be morally 
unacceptable and politically infeasible.  This is very much counterintuitive for a modern 
army that is understandably indoctrinated to fight and win wars on a modern battlefield 
with the most advanced technology and equipment.  Yet, it is this uncomfortable exercise 
in unconventional thinking that produces success.   
It is not enough to think differently and act accordingly, but to re-write doctrine 
and training in an effort to institutionalize such a(n) (r)evolutionary approach.  What 
makes matters most difficult is that this must be achieved by convincing or 
circumventing the stoic guardians of the norms that are to be contradicted; whose career 
incentives are inextricably linked to their existence.  Additionally, while cutting through 
the seemingly immovable institutional obstructions, the policymakers must be convinced 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
194 Ibid.; p. 11. 
195 Ibid.; p. 11. 
196 Ibid.; p. 15, emphasis in original. 
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that the conventional norms no longer apply and are apt to generate assured defeat.  This 
was the environment in which GEN Petraeus and his merry band of Ph.D.s had thrust 
themselves.   
Turning the Tide: Surging against the Insurgency 
 As was alluded to earlier in this chapter, the conventional application of force was 
not a winning strategy against the guerilla-style insurgency.  In order to truly adapt to the 
enemy’s strategy a political primer had to open the way for a bold, yet organizationally 
and doctrinally antithetical approach.  Much of the process and progress, as well as the 
obstacles to adaptation have been well documented.  This paper now turns to the manner 
in which the required steps were taken to overcome them.  Much of the following is 
drawn from the honest accounting that Thomas E. Ricks has given in his most recent 
book entitled, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in 
Iraq, 2006-2008.197 
There were a few strands of influence at play that seemed to have created the 
conditions for adaptation success.  First, the political, then the organizational, and finally 
the doctrinal adaptation had to take root; in that order. 
  As previously addressed, the decisions that policymakers are tasked with should 
guide all other instruments of state power (be it military, intelligence, diplomacy, etc.).  
In chapter two this was illustrated by the policymaking-intelligence community 
relationship.  In this chapter, the significance of a top-down approach –from the 
                                                            
197 Previously cited.  This work really maps out the “insurgency” within the politico-military realm that had 
birthed the counterinsurgency strategy, which had eventually prevailed.  It should be noted that there is no 
assertion here that a counterinsurgency doctrine employs a mirrored approach to insurgency.  That is, they 
are not the reverse/obverse of the same coin (ironic as the shorthand for Counterinsurgency is COIN). 
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uppermost echelons of political power down to the military chain-of-command and 
ultimately to the soldier on the ground –becomes clear.   
 A couple of political decisions had served as a major hindrance to success on the 
battlefield.  First, not only did American political prerogatives cause the military to be 
involved, but they then shaped and fueled the insurgency.  The evidence for this assertion 
is rather plain to see: Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 1 (16 May, 
2003) for “De-Baathification of Iraqi Society” and  CPA Order Number 2 (23 May, 
2003) Dissolution of Iraqi Entities (including the Iraqi Army).  Such decisions were taken 
arbitrarily by L. Paul Bremmer III (in charge of the occupation of Iraq).  It isn’t clear if 
he had received the green light to do so, but he certainly was warned by military leaders 
and the CIA station chief that the effect would be the creation of armed, trained, 
unemployed, dis-empowered, angry Iraqis on the order of tens of thousands.198 
 Secondly, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld had not only erred in 
trying to suppress opposition to his own doctrinal preferences, but had appeared to be so 
refractory that he became perhaps the biggest obstacle to the requisite adaptation.  With 
the hierarchical structure of the military, it was an impermissible course of action for 
sitting generals to criticize policy.  This took a different set of actors altogether.  It took 
the status and prestige of those who would not suffer the consequences of challenging the 
SecDef, the military establishment, and most importantly, the president and his 
administration, to surmount the seemingly insurmountable political obstacles.   
                                                            
198 Ricks, Fiasco.  Chapters 8 (“How to Create an Insurgency [I]”) and 9 (“How to Create an Insurgency 
[II]”) address these matters with great attention.  Also, see Nora Bensahel for a look at the impact of 
American mistakes had on the facilitation of the insurgency in, “Preventing Insurgencies After Major 
Combat Operations”, Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 278-291.  
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 General (GEN) Jack Keane (ret.) had the courage, wisdom, and gumption to 
pursue the top-down politico-military powers-that-be in order to break the strategic 
inertia.199  Once he had gotten the ball rolling, his supporting cadre of retired generals 
(also having nothing to lose but face) had begun to publicize their dissent.200  This had 
the force and effect of generating political pressure toward ousting Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld201 and taking up the strategy of COIN. 
 Having cleared the way and provided political cover to jump the chain-of-
command GEN David Petraeus was enabled to step into the commanding role that would 
set the climate, and force upon the military –in a top-down fashion –the requisite cultural 
change (read: adaptation) to meet the insurgency’s strategy.  To do this, he sought (in an 
iconoclastic fashion) to assemble the most inclusive list of participants in the process and 
implement a most counterintuitive doctrine.202   
 The mere fact that GEN Petraeus had been a COIN practitioner in his previous 
tour in Mosul was not in and of itself his most definitive contribution.  Rather, it was his 
ability to break with military tradition and convene a meeting on 23-24 February 2006, at 
the U.S. Army School of Advanced Studies (Ft. Leavenworth, KS) 203 that would include 
                                                            
199 Ricks, The Gamble, p. 14, 79-81.  Also, as cited on p. 88 in reference to a meeting that GEN Keane had 
with Rumsfeld and JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) Chairman Peter Pace: “‘We are edging toward strategic 
failure’, Keane warned the defense secretary.”  David Ucko argues that the success or failure of COIN in 
Iraq will likely determine the penetrable power of COIN doctrine into the resistant military establishment’s 
historically rooted institutional distaste for unconventional wars.  See Ucko, “Innovation or Inertia: The 
U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency”, Orbis, Spring 2008, pp. 290-310. 
200 Ibid.; pp. 38-39; e.g.: MG (Major General) Paul Eaton (ret.), MG John Batiste (ret.), MG Charles 
Swannack (ret.), MG John Riggs (ret.), LTG (Lieutenant General) Gregory Newbold (ret.), GEN Anthony 
Zinni (ret.), to name a few.   
201 Ibid.; “a major obstacle”, p. 58.  According to Philip Zelikow, Rumsfeld was lacking direction and 
vision, which had produced (or reflected) the unfortunate consequence of nebulous leadership; p. 77 
(paraphrased). 
202 Ibid.; p. 168.  
203 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, p. 119. 
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humanitarian experts, academics, COIN gurus, media elements, and critics of the war and 
its conduct.204  This key meeting would serve as the final revision of the COIN doctrine, 
as embodied in Field Manual 3-24.205 
 A common theme running through the above-cited works by Ricks, as well as the 
updated FM 3-24 is of great significance to this paper:  Politics appear to be both the 
obstacle, and the propellant that either inhibits or serves the interest of adaptation, 
respectively.  At the level of the top policymaking personalities, the sense of humility and 
flexibility seem to have combined with a better appreciation of reality to produce the 
most favored political conditions for adaptation.  It wasn’t until GEN Jack Keane and a 
number of academics and colonels had made it clear to both President Bush and Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates (Rumsfeld’s replacement) that the strategy of simply transitioning 
power to the Iraqis would not accomplish either the goals of democratizing Iraq, or 
exiting honorably from that country.206   
 No less an important persistent theme, is that related to the adaptation that had to 
take root within both the upper echelons of the military bureaucracy, and the 
organizationally resistant army itself.  This pursuit also required the same successful 
adaptation attributes as had applied to the aforementioned political realm.  What is more, 
the army had to become a learning organization and overturn many of the dearly held 
                                                            
204 Sadi Othman, Emma Sky, Sarah Sewall, to name a few.  Again in Ricks, The Gamble, p. 157 “Few anti-
war critics were as scathing of the conduct of the Iraq war as are Petraeus’s staff, such as [MG David] 
Fastabend, his chief of strategy.”  
205 FM 3-24 [Field Manual] The U.S. Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press Edition, 2007). 
206 Ibid.; pp. 122- 124, 133-137, 225-227, 261.  It is in these pages that one can see that the features of 
humility and flexibility were of paramount significance as precursors to a strategic shift.  The requisite 
interactive element appears to have been the honest conveyance of truth by the most authoritative general 
(Petraeus) to the most senior policymaker (President Bush).  Simply put, no fear of upsetting the boss, just 
honest straight talk in the language of common objectives.  
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and culturally embedded tenets of military operations and tactics.207  Thomas E. Ricks 
reminds us of this salient point: 
The biggest single strategic change in Iraq in 2007, the one that preceded all others and 
enabled them, may also have been the least noticed one: a new sobriety in the mind-set of 
the U.S. military.  It wasn’t just the Bush administration that had taken years to face 
reality in Iraq.  The military also was slow to learn.208 
 
Even after operational planning began to reflect the necessary jointness among the 
service branches, it was not devoid of organizational parochialism209: 
Concerned that the shift to irregular challenges would lead to a cut in its force structure 
and budget, the Air Force proposed a greater reliance on airpower in activities like 




207 For the principles regarding organizational learning, see the multitude of forewords and introductions 
that occupy the FM 3-24 (Chicago University Press addition, as cited previously), and for the 
counterintuitive aspects of a counterinsurgency strategy see pp. 47-52.  See also, Eliot Cohen; LTC Conrad 
Crane; LTC (ret.) Jan Horvath; LTC (ret.) John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of 
Counterinsurgency”, Military Review, March-April, 2006, pp. 49-53.  Particularly, pp. 52-53.  Also, the 
point that “counterinsurgency is still not a military activity and current doctrine should reflect that fact” is a 
fair assertion that Alexander Alderson makes on p. 35 in “US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally’s 
Perspective”, Parameters, Winter 2007-08; pp. 33-45. 
208 FM 3-24; p. 160.  This was a very big step, as it ran counter to the technologically dominated, ideally 
envisaged battlefield of the future.  See p. 161-164; on p. 163: “The new humility of American 
commanders amounted to the starting point for the new strategy.”  Also on p. 192, “The improvements in 
American operations were technical as well as doctrinal, tactical, and cultural.”  What is more, Ricks has 
said, on p. 223, that GEN Petraeus had “brought the means and ends of U.S. strategy more into balance.”  
This point should not be taken lightly, as the task of harmonizing these very codependent elements are the 
purview of the policymaker.    
209 Max Boot argues that the “network-centric” warfare that has become vogue still suffers from resistance 
from the Air Force, Navy (and Marines) to their changed mission roles.  This is exemplified by their 
insistence on the relevance of new expensive and prestigious projects such as the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter.  See, “The New American Way of War”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 4 (July/August 
2003), pp. 41-58; the aforementioned discussion is had on pp. 57-58. 
210 Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy, Steven Metz (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 
2008); p. 178 (emphasis added). 
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Just as the military has difficulty breaking away from its “big war” mentality, the State 
Department’s organizational culture tends to focus on diplomacy rather than the 
reconstruction or transformation of other states.211 
 In order for such an adaptation to take place, the “strategy vacuum”212 in the 
White House had to be reconciled.  Still, GEN Petraeus had to contend with the ego of 
his CENTCOM (Central Command) Commander, Admiral William Fallon and engage 
the “bureaucratic infighting” among the JCS213.  The fact that these obstacles had to be 
bypassed represented for Admiral Fallon and the JCS an alarming prospect: that the 
chain-of-command was circumvented, and consequently rendered impotent.  The 
psychological discomfort associated with this approach had been difficult to swallow.  
This radical break with tradition was the only way forward. 
 As alluded to earlier, Amy B. Zegart has asserted that the rational self-interest of 
policymakers is an enduring reality.  This was evident beyond the bureaucratic realm and 
was indeed a matter that had placed congressional democrats in a political catch-22.  
While they could publicly oppose the war, they could not afford to appear to be 
unsupportive in funding the troops and being ultimately responsible for any disastrous 
failure that might attach.214   
Chapter Summary 
 The discussion in this chapter was aimed at addressing the obstacles to adaptation 
success by process tracing.  One key theme that emerges here is that the comfort of a 
standard-bearing doctrine can, over time, lapse into intellectual torpor.  This is further 
                                                            
211 Ibid.; p. 179. 
212 Ricks, The Gamble; pp. 224 and 235. 
213 Ibid.; pp. 230-237. 
214 Ibid.; pp. 244-251.  Also, within these pages it is clear that the political self-interest of Senators Clinton 
and Obama was a consideration, as they would later make a bid for the office of the presidency. 
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compounded by organizational hubris and strategic atrophy.  The cure seems to be similar 
to what Richard K. Betts (cited earlier) referred to as the unrealistic solution of having a 
president who likes to be challenged, while being given the unvarnished truth without the 















215 Betts, “The New Politics of Intelligence”, fn. 59.  The term president could be easily replaced by 
Secretary of Defense, Director of National Intelligence, Secretary for Policy Planning, etc. 
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Chapter 3: Conclusion 
 
For national security and defense matters, the organs that extend policy to its 
purported objectives are by definition organizations.   If policy objectives are clear and a 
coherent strategy has been devised in earnest, normatively speaking, the intended 
outcome should be a success.  However, when policy (Grand Strategy) objectives are 
unrealistic and/or the strategy developed for their implementation is inappropriate to suit 
the task, there exists an inherent deficiency in the means-ends continuum.  This paper 
was formed with the express purpose of establishing where some deficiencies have 
developed between policymakers and two broad instruments of state power; namely, the 
Intelligence Community and the military.    
 The first chapter began by briefly describing the emerging threat environment that 
had been developing for some time, which had climaxed in America having experienced 
its most destructive attack in history. 216  The substantive matter that followed was an 
attempt to build on Amy Zegart’s work.  By accepting the basic tenets of her work there 
was a conscious effort to go further and separate some of the cognitive barriers from the 
systemic constructs that advanced causal pressures, ultimately contributing to failure.   
                                                            
216 This exogenous shock had provided the impetus for the U.S. military to thrust itself into the heart of 
central and southwest Asia.  The rise of a “transnational insurgency” as some have called it, was committed 
to revising the established order of international affairs through subversion, sabotage and terrorism. 
Ralph Wipfli and Dr. Steven Metz, “COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy”, Colloquium 
Brief, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, January 2008; p. 3.  Also see Steven Metz, 
“New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency”, Parameters, Winter 2007-
08, pp. 20-32.  On p. 21, “Al Qaeda and its affiliates adopted a strategy relying heavily on the methods of 
insurgency- both national insurgency and a transnational one.” 
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The systemic view did reveal some points of friction along the IC-policymaking 
line.  Having examined two cases (Iraq 2002-3 and Iran 1979), by way of Robert Jervis’s 
research, it became clear that though intelligence failures appear on the surface to be a 
product of the IC, it is not enough to simply lay blame at the doorstep of the organs of 
intelligence.  Rather, it was necessary to expose the relational elements that appeared to 
be in operation between policymaking and intelligence production.   
 The second substantive chapter dealt with military cultural and doctrinal 
stagnation.  It is hoped that the chapter was successful in elucidating the pathway from 
stasis to rapid change.  The engine of adaptation was a necessary, but cautious, break 
with deeply embedded institutional norms.  Kalev I. Sepp summarizes this concept best 
when he says, “American military strategic culture has retarded the transition of military 
operations from conventional to unconventional warfare.”217 Furthermore:  
In actuality American military culture is grounded in the simple principals of firepower 
and mass.  Mirroring both strengths and a notable weakness of the broader American 
society, its military forces are highly reliant on technology and logistics, and generally 
ignorant of cultures beyond their borders.218 
The process of becoming adaptable was not only a departure from military 
tradition, in that a strategy that ran counter to what was familiar and comfortable would 
be displaced by a paradoxical set of newly learned principles.  There was also a sense that 
                                                            
217 Kalev I. Sepp, “From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds’: the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency 
capability in Iraq”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2007, pp. 217-230.  This quote was drawn from 
p. 222. 
218 Ibid.; pp. 222-223.  On p. 224, Sepp goes on to state that, “… the nature of the war in Iraq must be 
examined to determine how the war has changed over time- and whether the US military has changed with 
it.”  On p. 225, he recalls SecDef Rumsfeld’s vision of “the ‘transformation’ of its [the military] services to 
fight rapid, decisive expeditions in preference to long, grinding counterinsurgencies.”  Another point that 
Sepp makes on p. 228 (while drawing on the work of Edward Luttwak) is that “…a large army has a large 
internal bureaucracy, which is inherently inflexible in any fundamental way, and resistant to adaptation 
above the level of its smaller tactical units.” 
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the standard chain-of-command itself had stood in the way, in some cases all the way to 
the highest political levels.219   
Strategy Deficit220 
… after 9/11… suddenly the foundations of the world had shifted a little bit, where the 
focus on conventional transformation, high technology, rapid maneuver, all these things 
that were known as the revolution in military affairs, people talked about just before 9/11, 
seemed to be a little less relevant to the environment than what we’ve seen now.  And 
some people have described this as a counter-revolution in military affairs, led to a 
certain extent by David Petraeus. 
–David Kilcullen221 
As was discussed earlier, the paradigmatic paralysis that perpetuated throughout 
the decade following the Cold War was suddenly jolted into consciousness on 11 
September, 2001.  No longer were the competing theories for peacetime engagement and 
retrenchment relevant options.  America was in a state of shock, followed by a new 
opportunity. The new circumstances that were forced upon the United States provided an 
opening through which a narrow strategic focus could materialize.  As any good strategy 
would be incomplete without a military component, a global martial response was 
devised to eliminate threats (both real and imagined) that had yet to develop.   
 For better or for worse, America assumed a preventive strategic posture in that 
she could not bear the thought of another surprise attack of such a magnitude.   Perhaps 
                                                            
219 Though it is noted by Beatrice Heuser that the success of FM 3-24 had been the result of “high-ranking 
military leaders’ receptivity to new ideas…” She went on to praise SecDef Rumsfeld’s acknowledgment of 
this point, “… a few days before he resigned from office…”  See p. 166 in Heuser, “The Cultural 
Revolution in Counter-Insurgency”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, 153-171, February, 
2007.  Heuser’s point regarding Rumsfeld is not a very helpful one, as it was earlier stressed in this paper 
that he shared a relatively large portion of the blame for being unreceptive.  That he suddenly had an attack 
of clarity on his way out of the Pentagon is too little, and too late to be praiseworthy.   
220 As termed by Colin S. Gray in his foreword to Metz’s Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy.  
Throughout Metz’s book he draws attention to the idea that American strategic thought was stale.  
“Without a central strategic paradigm, American security policy tends toward astrategic meandering and 
‘ad hocery’”; p. xxi. 
221 “David Kilcullen Interview – Part I”, The Charlie Rose Show, 5 October, 2007. 
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one of the greatest tragedies, aside from the death and destruction unleashed on that 
fateful day, was the zeal with which strategic choices were made at the cost of lucid 
thought.  The old adage that “haste makes waste” is descriptive of the period that 
followed.  It is common guidance that one should not make important decisions when one 
is angry.  America needed a focal point; a monolithic entity toward which channeled 
enmity could have a sharpening effect on policy.  America needed a strategy.  
 Naturally, the most comfortable approach to problem solving is that which is most 
familiar222.  At the political level this was accomplished by asserting that an “axis of evil” 
was hard at work, planning America’s downfall.  At the same time, a linkage was drawn 
between rogue states’ leaders’ capabilities and terrorists’ intentions.  The logic was all 
too fallible,223 yet it would suffice for the time being in that domestic support ran high for 
the president. 
 That policymakers lacked vision and clarity is not so much the point of this paper.  
Rather, it is the policy choices that are made under new threat conditions, and what the 
resultant revelations tell us about adaptability.  Whether policy thinking properly guides 
the IC and the military is of some interest.  Still, whether intelligence and military means 
are suitable in supporting strategy ends is the perpetual question explored in this paper.   
These questions are not enough to inform the student of international relations as 
to the origins of failure.  For this to be better understood it has been a central focus of this 
paper to look at intelligence failures and military failures through the various mechanisms 
that link them to strategic failure.  This paper asserts that failing to adapt to an ever-
                                                            
222 Metz, Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy, p. 80. 
223 Ibid.; p. 97. 
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evolving threat environment seems not only to be prevalent with regard to the 
Intelligence Community-policymaker nexus, but also within the politico-military 
relationship.  That similar causal forces seem to breed circumstances in which adaptation 
failure may result says something about the potentiality of corrective prescriptions that 
seek to forestall future failures.  In other words, while it is easy to conclude that a 
reorganization of the IC would help to thwart future surprise attacks it isn’t quite so 
simple.224  Additionally, to employ an incongruous military strategy to meet a strategic 
task is tantamount to committing to failure.  
 In order to gain insight into the underlying motivational biases that guide 
behavior, the levels of analysis in this work ranged from individual (key personalities) to 
group (organizational tendencies), and even systemic (polarity and paradigm-shifting) 
dynamics.  The concept that truly gave life to this paper -and formed the arguments 
therein -may be illustrated best (though admittedly in a lengthy quote) by Dr. Metz: 
The Iraq conflict showed the degree to which idiosyncratic factors influence strategy.  It 
comes as no surprise that personalities matter greatly.  Had not George W. Bush been 
president and Donald Rumsfeld secretary of defense, the 2003 intervention would have 
been much less likely, probably impossible.  But organizational idiosyncrasies matter as 
well.  In the 1990’s each of the U.S. armed services promoted its own vision of the future 
security environment to shape defense transformation to their institutional advantage. For 
a variety of reasons, the Air Force and the Navy dominated.  This lead to the Joint Vision 
model of transformation.  The Army was dragged along, stressing that it too could 
perform with speed and precision rather than arguing that speed and precision were not 
panaceas for all security problems.  As a result, when the U.S. military found itself in a 
type of conflict not amenable to speed and precision firepower-counterinsurgency-it was 
unprepared.   
The Iraq conflict demonstrated that Americans remain more comfortable with 
technological, operational, and tactical innovation than with strategic adaptation.225 
                                                            
224 Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform, Richard A. Posner, (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006).  For a discussion of the “blame culture” that Congress 
operates under and the fallacy of the reorganization argument see pp. 4-8, and 44. 




This extends well beyond the military’s inter-service rivalry and bureaucratic 
bickering.  The strategy deficit alluded to above is rooted at the political level: 
When faced with challenges, the United States tends to reorganize and create new 
programs rather than alter or reconceptualize its strategy.  In a broader sense, the Iraq 
conflict showed that outside the military, there is a dearth of strategic thinking and 
planning in the U.S. government.  The National Security Council is not configured for 
developing true strategy with both a horizontal and vertical dimension.  It formulates 
policies.  While the State Department once had an impressive strategy-making capability 
in its Policy Planning Staff, there is little sign that the current manifestation of this plays 
anywhere near the role that its Cold War predecessor did when it included people like 
George Kennan and Paul Nitze.226 
 The U.S. national security apparatus created after WWII emerged under 
competitive organizational conditions.227  Although it may not have been the most ideal 
arrangement, communism presented an identifiable threat and the Soviet Union a 
distinguishable enemy.  Further, such clarity had made the strategy of containment rather 
simple to understand and implement.  Grand Strategy was nearly as straightforward in 
that the instruments of state power were arrayed in support thereof.  After the Cold War 
had ended –and more so after 9/11 –the multifarious and diffuse nature of global 
terrorism has obscured the landscape in which threats had appeared.   
 This paper began with the notion that a failure to adapt characterizes both the 
IC’s response to a global menace and the military’s late reaction to a loosely aligned 
threat in the CENTCOM theater of combat.  Like Amy B. Zegart’s explanation of the 
contributory factors related to the former, there are at least some causal resemblance in 
                                                            
226 Ibid.; also p. 202. 
227 This is the central theme of Zegart’s first book, Flawed by Design (cited earlier).  Through 
organizational “pulling and hauling” the 1947 National Security Act had been a compromise that suited the 
parties vying for President Truman’s attention to their self-purported centrality to national security.  
Further, as Kilcullen asserts in The Accidental Guerilla (pp. 6-7), “The United States, with national security 
institutions developed mainly under the Truman administration, has struggled to adapt these institutions to 
post-9/11 threats.”   
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the latter.  When the two are juxtaposed for examination, it appears that both seem to 
suggest a paucity of strategic vision;228 the umbrella under which they tend to huddle.    
 The three “enduring realities” that Zegart had claimed were responsible for the 
purported “intelligence failures” appear to have also played a similar role in the initial 
military failures that followed.  Recalling the triumvirate Zegart postulated:  
… I argue that agency adaptation failure can be attributed to three enduring realities: (1) 
the nature of organizations, which makes internal reform exceedingly difficult; (2) the 
rational self-interests of political officials, which work against executive branch reform; 
and (3) the fragmented structure of the federal government, which erects high barriers to 
legislative reform.229 
Although they appear in slightly different form in the military realm, the 
principles remain operational.  Extrapolating from this explanatory model, the previous 
chapter sought to illustrate the first of these three points.  On the second point, the term 
“political officials” could be replaced with any number of variables that reflect the 
obstructing personalities (and their resistance to change) within the Defense Department.  
The third point is best illuminated as follows: 
… through the ‘military-industrial complex,’ a substantial portion of the American 
economy, and numerous jobs in almost every congressional district, are linked to the 
production of conventional war-fighting capacity.  It takes factories, jobs, and industrial 
facilities to build battleships and bombers, but aid workers, linguists, and Special Forces 
operators are vastly cheaper and do not demand the same industrial base.  So shifting 
spending priorities onto currently unconventional forms of warfare would cost jobs and 
votes in the congressional districts of the very people who control that spending.230 
 
                                                            
228 David Kilcullen summarizes the strategic flaw as follows: “Despite the undeniable tactical success of 
the surge, in the final analysis this study suggests that the large-scale, high profile, unilateral, über-
blitzkrieg manner in which the Coalition invaded Iraq (and the inherent strategic concept of the Iraq 
campaign itself) was deeply flawed.  In my view the war, in grand-strategic terms, was a deeply misguided 
and counterproductive undertaking, an extremely severe strategic error, and a model of exactly how not to 
do business.”  Both emphases in the original, The Accidental Guerilla, p. 117. 
229 Zegart, Spying Blind (cited earlier), p. 43.  For an in-depth explanation of a “general model of agency 
adaptation failure” see pp. 49-59. 
230 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla, p. 27. 
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The above suggests a strategy trap, particularly as organizations become wedded 
to the resources that support the strategy; thus making the emergence of a different 
strategy for a different set of problems that much more difficult.  One final theme that 
runs parallel with the foregoing is that, “All strategic possibilities (perhaps even the long-
discredited scenario of territorial warfare in Europe) must be taken into account, and 
defence spending must not be allowed to become victim to strategic fashion.”231  This 
point is important because it highlights the shortsightedness of strategic thinking and 
resource allocation.   
There is no strategic panacea suggested here.  National security threats will likely 
continue to emerge, evolve and transform in infinite ways.  In order to effectively 
respond and adapt in a timely fashion it is necessary that policymakers and their 
bureaucratic subordinates be flexible and subdue political prerogatives in the interest of 
national security.  Warning: if strategic choices are guided by zeitgeist, foresight will 
inevitably suffer.  The result could be costly and deadly. 
Policy Implications and Some Suggestions 
 Replicating the precise conditions under which success and failure had obtained is 
impossible.  However, there are some policy implications and a few suggestions that flow 
from them that deserve some brief discussion.   
Conveying policy priorities and their underlying logic:  Given the repetitive 
miscommunication between policymakers and the IC, there appears to be a bilateral 
                                                            
231 Paul Cornish, “The United States and counterinsurgency: ‘political first, political last, political always’”, 
International Affairs, 85: I (2009) 61-79.  On p. 70 Cornish warns of the “enduring fallacy in strategic 
debates” in elevating one strategic paradigm to the neglect of others. 
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misunderstanding.  That policy-makers have certain intelligence priorities is insufficient 
without a deeper understanding of why they seek what they seek.  This circumstance is 
apt to produce assumptions that the managing authorities in the IC may be compelled to 
make in the absence of an adequate understanding.  Further down the intelligence cycle 
this could lead to misguided collection.   
Therefore, one suggestion is that more attention be paid to why certain 
intelligence is sought.  The difficulty in so doing may cause conflict and an appearance of 
acting outside of the IC’s appropriate subordinate role.  Still, if one were told to search 
for a needle in a haystack it may help to understand the needle’s significance to the 
requesting party.    
 Understanding one’s own fallibility and the frailty of human cognition:  Whether 
applied to the policymaker, the analyst, or the management betwixt the two, recognizing 
the limits of perception is not an easy task.  Tenacious attachment to any concept may 
inadvertently satisfy the desire to maintain cognitive consistency, while reinforcing 
obsolete policies or assumptions.  This comes at a heavy cost to sound judgment for both 
the IC and the military, as well as their political principals.   
 Perhaps it would be wise to have a class of honest truth-sayers at hand to 
moderate what may tend to look like the work of soothsayers.  In other words, if 
disinterested advisers were made available to review the most important evaluations and 
decisions that were made then perchance the probability of failure might be diminished. 
         Flexibility must not be overlooked as an essential ingredient in adaptation: The 
more rigid a policy or doctrine, the less accommodating it will be.  The same is true for 
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the personalities that uphold it.  What stood out most as a common theme throughout this 
paper was the personal attachment (and their attendant vested interests) that some key 
individuals had to policies that were failing.  This remained constant until more flexible 
personalities or paradigms were introduced.   
 One possible solution to this problem would be to follow the pathway that GEN 
Petreaus has so clearly pioneered.  For instance, not only did he have the courage to risk 
his meritorious career in order to avert the disaster that shortsighted and inflexible 
policymakers had triggered.  He also had changed the promotion criteria for his 
subordinates to reflect the value of thinking “outside the box” and being bold and 
creative, rather than “toeing the line.”  The IC could benefit from such personnel 
practices as well.  
 The continued misallocation of necessary resources may only serve to undermine 
adaptation to future threats as they emerge: As was alluded to numerous times 
throughout this paper, the promotion of expensive technologically superior implements of 
intelligence gathering and war-fighting do not promise to deliver that which only the 
human can.  What should be clear by now is that a group of dedicated warriors with small 
arms can be a very effective adversary.      
 In answering an intelligence question, there is no replacement for a linguistically 
well-versed HUMINT asset on the ground.  For example, detecting the presence of a 
military unit is not as significant as learning about that unit’s structure, morale, training 
and key personalities.  If the center of gravity for a COIN campaign is the population, 
bombs and bullets will fail to convey the message that only a human can.  
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 In sum, it is useful to highlight precisely what the changed threat environment 
means to the world’s only remaining superpower: “For the first time in history, great 




















A Word on the INTs: 
 In order to better understand “intel-speak”, one must understand that the means of 
collection for the IC are separated into two very distinct categories of acquisition: 
TECHINT (Technical Intelligence) and HUMINT (Human Intelligence).  TECHINT is 
further subdivided into subgroups, such as SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) and the subsets 
ELINT (Electronics Intelligence), TELINT (Telemetry Intelligence) and FISINT 
(Foreign Instrument Signals Intelligence) and so on.   IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) and 
MASINT (Measures and Signatures Intelligence) are commonly heard terms and form a 
central part of the TECHINT spectrum. 
 HUMINT (Human Intelligence) is the human penetration of a target 
state/organization for the purposes of discovering secrets.  This consists of further contact 
with a member(s) of the target state/organization who can be massaged for actionable 
information that would fill in intelligence gaps (or corroborate other intelligence sources) 
regarding capabilities, and more importantly, the intentions of the target 
state/organization.  Motives for human assets are generally said to be a result of financial 
gain, disaffection with the regime/organization, promise of asylum, and sometimes a 
deceptive ploy by the target state/actor, producing a double agent.  This sort of 
intelligence work is often romanticized about in spy novels.   
 There is another area of intelligence gathering that is arguably very accurate:  
OSINT (Open Source Intelligence).  Intelligence analysts, academics, policymakers, and 
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the avid reader with an interest in such matters can often glean significant intelligence 
from OSINT.  This may be a double-edge sword, as the following example illustrates: 
In 1951 he [DCI Walter Bedell “Beetle” Smith] enlisted the services of a group of able 
and qualified academicians from one of our large universities for some summer work.  To 
save their time he furnished them publications, news articles, hearings of the Congress, 
government releases, monographs, speeches, all available to anyone for the asking.  He 
then commissioned them to determine what kind of an estimate of U.S. military 
capabilities the Soviets could put together from these unclassified sources.  Their 
conclusions indicated that in a few weeks for work by a task force on this open literature 
our opponents could acquire important insight into many sectors of our national defense.  
In fact, when the findings of the university analysts were circulated to President Truman 
and to other policymakers at the highest level, they were deemed to be so accurate that 
the extra copies were ordered destroyed and the few copies that were retained were given 
a high classification.233 
 The reason the distinction between HUMINT, TECHINT, and OSINT is made 
here is two-fold.  First, illuminating the various means of intelligence acquisition is 
useful in that many of the sources of contention within the IC may be attributed to 
interagency bickering and political maneuvering over budget, turf, and organizational 
relevance centering on the purported strengths and weaknesses of the various subordinate 
INTs.  Secondly, to place in context the voices of reform, as they may represent certain 
interests that place them in a position of bias. 
 For example, CIA is divided into four functional directorates: DI (Directorate of 
Intelligence), NCS (National Clandestine Service, formerly the DO [Directorate of 
Operations]), DS &T (Directorate of Science and Technology), and DS (Directorate of 
Support).  The DI is where the analysts reside, and the NCS is where operators practicing 
the tradecraft of HUMINT reside.  Between the DI and the NCS the cultures are very 
                                                            
233The Craft of Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); p. 240, chapter entitled, 
“Security in a Free Society” (pp. 237-255).  In a later version of this work the quote underwent negligible 
modification: The Craft of Intelligence: America’s Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of 
Intelligence Gathering for a Free World, (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, re-print 2006 by Joan Buresch 
Talley); p. 238. 
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different; it is as though they speak different languages.  Naturally, their interests are as 
disparate as their duties.   
NSA (National Security Agency) deals with IA (Information Assurance), 
research, and SIGINT.  By law, the head of NSA is a four star Air Force General.  This 
creates the potential for bias, in that it is TECHINT heavy and partially reliant on air-
breathing aerial SIGINT platforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
